



Unveil, O Thou who givest sustenance to the world, that face of the true Sun, which is now hidden by a vase of golden light ! so that we may see the truth and know our whole duty.

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SUGGESTION

Here is a lucid explanation given by the late Mr. Robert Crosbie, which will serve as an answer to enquiries received by us on the subject of the influence and power of suggestion:—

The power of suggestion means many different things to many minds. It is coupled with the idea of hypnosis, where the operator is able to make the subject think, say, do, or imagine anything he chooses. That is possible through the abnormal condition of the subject. The means and methods of inducing this abnormal condition are not generally known, although some practitioners have hit upon various ways of bringing on hypnosis in some subjects.

But what is to be considered is the fact of suggestion itself, generally considered, and as it affects all men. People are not

aware that they act almost entirely under suggestion. From our birth we are surrounded by those who suggest certain ideas to us as being true, and we follow those suggested ideas.

There is very, very little *original* thought anywhere and particularly is this true in those lines to which the public pays the most attention, that is, politics, religion, science. Whatever system of thought is presented to us, that we adopt. We follow the suggestion given with no attempt to reach to the basis of that which is suggested. The foundation upon which the suggestion rests is taken for granted, even in the most important things in life.

Our religion, for example, is stated to us to be a "revelation". We accepted it in childhood, accepted it as a fact, without looking into it to see what it

is and on what it is based. Our powers of thought and action being based upon a false suggestion does not inhibit their exercise, but it means that all our possibilities of thought and action, all our mental creations, the whole superstructure of our existence, will be false, because, thinking from false premises, our thinking will inevitably lead to false conclusions.

And this is just as truly the fact as in the case of the hypnotized subject. He is thrown into an abnormal condition; he has nothing before his mind; the operator presents a given idea and with it the suggestion of a certain mode of action. Immediately the subject adopts the suggestion, goes to work on it, and will continue working along the suggested line cumulatively until the suggestion is changed.

Those who are born into any particular sect ought to know this. With our first sense of understanding ideas are presented to us, instilled into our minds as absolute facts. We proceed from that basis, and however long it is followed, no true understanding or conclusion can be reached. What do we know of the truth or falsity of these ideas when presented to us in childhood? Nothing whatever. What do our parents and teachers know of them? They have merely passed on to us the suggestions which they received in childhood and which have operated in them cumulatively ever since.

We must learn not to accept

statements, no matter by whom made, simply because they are made to us. We must get at the basis of whatever is presented to us, know what its principles are, whether those principles are *self-evident*. If they are not self-evident, how can they be *basic*?

The idea is common to everybody in the Western world that there is a Creator of this universe. What do we know about it? Does the acceptance of that idea give us any understanding? If it is true that a being created the universe and all the beings in it, then we are not responsible. In continuance of that idea other ideas follow it: the idea that man is here but once, that this is his only birth and that from here he knows not where he goes. We have followed the suggestion that man lives but one life, that he is fundamentally irresponsible for his being here, and we have built up our thoughts and actions on that basis. Does it make us wiser, happier, while we live? Does it produce peace and happiness for others? Does it bring us to the end of life, any wiser, any better off? For we know that when we come to the end of life we live every earthly thing we have gained while here.

But this earth is only one of many earths. What of the other planets, the other solar systems with which space is filled? Have we any vital knowledge in regard to them or the reason for their existence under the suggestions that have been handed to us?

And when our religious impres-

sions are changed, when other suggestions are given us, are they not handed to us in the same way? Whatever they are—"Mental Science," "New Thought," "Christian Science," and so on—we adopt them, move along the lines suggested by those who give them to us, and what do we really learn? Nothing. We come to the end of life just as encased in ignorance for all the "revelations" ever given us. What do we know of their bases? Are they true or only partially so? We are never asked to look into their fundamentals to see for ourselves if they are true, self-evident. No; we are asked to accept what is given us and go to work on that. That is suggestion.

Our municipal life, our national life, our political life, are all under suggestion, and they are but few who try to go to the root of things and understand what the nature of being is, so that they can know for themselves and thus act with power and knowledge. As we look the field over we will find

that we are all prey to the power of suggestion in every direction.

What is the criterion which we should apply to every suggestion presented to us? Just this: If we have the truth it will explain what was before a mystery. And as we are surrounded by mysteries, the Truth must explain them all.

This power of suggestion must still be used, whatever line may be pointed out to us. If Truth exists and is possible to us—the Truth in religion, science and philosophy—it must first come to us by suggestion from those who know. If it were not possible for this to be done, were not possible for us to avail ourselves of it, then there would be no use in talking of these things. But when the true is suggested to us, there is always a means presented by which we may see and verify it. That means is not in any one's authority or endorsement, but in the fact that we can perceive it and test it for ourselves. *The final authority is the man himself.*

Having become indifferent to objects of perception, the pupil must seek out the Raja of the senses, the Thought-Producer, he who awakes illusion. The Mind is the great Slayer of the Real. Let the Disciple slay the Slayer. Mind is like a mirror; it gathers dust while it reflects. It needs the gentle breezes of Soul-Wisdom to brush away the dust of our illusions. Seek O Beginner, to blend thy Mind and Soul. Have mastery o'er thy Soul, O seeker after truths undying, if thou would'st reach the goal,

—THE VOICE OF THE SILENCE

THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD UNDERSTANDING

[F. S. C. Northrop is now the Advocate Professor of Philosophy at Yale University, and Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.]

In this article he views the march of scientific materialism, on a new route, which starts in Greece; he traces the fundamental difference between Europe and America and then offers some interesting reflections about the basic distinction between the West and the East. The West is struggling to perceive the reality of matter and form, the East to uncover their maya.—EDS.]

It should be a commonplace of all conduct that man can only do what his mind sets before him as a possibility. Hence all of man's creations, including even his culture, are a function of his imagination. Or stated negatively, man cannot initiate a definite line of conduct if that particular type of behaviour has never occurred to him as a possibility.

It is important to keep this in mind in considering the difficult problem of world understanding. This becomes evident when it is noted that in asking one people to understand another, particularly if the one is of the East and the other of the West, we are often asking them to appreciate as of vital importance attitudes toward life and experience which have never occurred to them even in imagination as possibilities. The point is that every division of humanity, as its civilization and culture come to fruition, unconsciously is guided to certain phases of experience in terms of which it conceives of life and reality, and shapes its own destiny. Moreover these categories differ from people to people, and within a given cul-

ture from time to time. The tendency is also for each people and period to conceive of its categories as all-sufficient.

The briefest consideration of the development of Western history will make this clear. The matter can be best approached by directing attention upon a certain point. Consider the entirely different interests of men in Western Europe in the Middle Ages and in the Modern World. Then if one were to think of an outstanding person, a Churchman would come to mind, now an industrialist holds the same position; then man's interest was more in some other world, now it is concentrated in feverish activity upon this one. Why the difference? Certainly the universe of experience from which all knowledge and thought is drawn does not change, nor has man himself in his physiological organization been altered. Even the most ardent temporalist, the most excited student of biological and human evolution must admit that such changes call for hundreds of thousands of years and not a few odd centuries for their consummation. Clearly it is man's

thought concerning what is important in life which has changed. In short, it is his philosophy that has altered.

Once this is recognised we find ourselves with a certain philosophy of history. It may be stated as follows: *Each age or culture is the fruition in practice of a certain philosophy in thought. When the philosophy changes civilization is altered.*

Let us note precisely how this has worked itself out in the last twenty-odd centuries of history. Again, because of my own familiarity with this subject, I choose the Western World, meaning by that, more particularly, the civilization of Western Europe and America.

This story is for the most part an account of the scientific attitude of mind, although if so regarded, it must be recognized that science takes on different meanings and emphases at different stages of its history. Elsewhere* I have given a rough account of this development. Only a few major points need be noted here.

This new era in Western culture opened when the Greeks became logical about the observed factors of their experience. Before them there had been science of the empirical type. But for the most part, it was with the Greeks that facts were brought under general principles and required to fit into and be illuminated by theoretical ideas that meet the test of consistency.

By thus combining an increas-

ing number of observations of nature with disciplined formal thinking concerning these empirical materials the Greeks gradually came through science to three rival philosophical conceptions of the nature of things. I have called them the physical, mathematical and functional theories of nature. They are to be associated roughly with Leucippus, Plato, and Aristotle respectively.

The outlines of these theories are well known. The physical theory of nature, better known as the kinetic atomic theory, conceives of reality as an infinite number of very small invisible particles of matter in motion in a vast infinitely extended container called absolute space. The mathematical theory entails the conception of nature as a system of pure ideas or forms, which may be grasped only with the intellect and which are in themselves purely formal. The functional theory regards nature as a process of becoming, a teleological activity in which matter and form interact to constitute the experienced universe.

It is to be noted that these three theories turn around one fundamental issue: the question of the relation between matter and form. Thus the physical theory holds that all form except spatial relatedness reduces to matter and motion, the mathematical theory holds that all matter is a mere appearance which is conditioned completely by form, whereas the functional theory takes the other

* *Science and First Principles*. (Macmillan, New York, 1931)

position that both matter and form are causes.

This issue between matter and form is very important for an understanding of Western civilization. It is the constant factor throughout Western thought. *Only if one recognizes that the West is concentrating on the question as to whether matter or form is primary can its history be understood or its difference from the culture of the East be appreciated.* To the latter point we shall return later.

Let us consider first how the three theories formulated by the Greeks worked themselves out in history. Since they constitute the only possible answers to the problem of the relation between matter and form, it follows, unless Western thought shifts its attention to an entirely different issue, that the history of the Western world can be nothing more or less than the story of the fate of these three theories before historical circumstance and new empirical evidence. As I have indicated elsewhere this happens to be the case.

Following the Greek period the mathematical theory in the form of a degenerate Platonism overlaid with mysticism from the East, came into the ascendancy. From this ascendancy the Middle or Dark Ages follows quite naturally. Attention upon the epistemological consequences of a mathematical philosophy will make this clear. We have noted that this theory regards the universe as a system of eternal changeless forms which can only

be grasped by the intellect. Obviously such a thesis goes counter to what nature exhibits itself as being. Certainly nature is observed to be physical and to be changing. To this a defender of the mathematical theory can make but one reply: reality is quite different from what nature appears to be. Thus there arises the Platonic epistemological principle to the effect, that the real is suggested by but not contained in sensation.

Stated more bluntly, this means that one cannot make the mathematical theory reasonable without deprecating nature in itself in the interest of some other ideal world known only by reason. Thus the Middle Ages with its neglect of science and its otherworldly interest arises. In short, once man gets the idea that the real things in life are outside the world of sensation, loss of interest in this world follows naturally. In this manner philosophy determines the character of the civilization of an Age.

Space does not permit a detailed completion of the story. The interested reader will find it in the book to which I have previously referred. Suffice it to say that with Thomas Aquinas the foundations of Western culture were lifted from the philosophy of Plato to that of Aristotle, which teaches that the real is given in the world of sensation, thus bringing back an interest in nature for its own sake, from which humanism and science naturally follow, and that in the seventeenth century with Galilei and

Newton the physical theory of nature became the dominant intellectual chart for Western conduct.

EUROPE vs. AMERICA

This last point is very important. It must be fully grasped if modern Western Europe and particularly the United States are to be understood. *The physics of Galilei and Newton is the key to the modern Western World.* This elemental fact is usually overlooked, even by the philosophers of Europe and America. *The fact is that Western modern professional philosophy is not the philosophy of the modern Western World.* Spinoza, Kant, Hegel and Bradley are reactions from the real philosophy of Western thought, rather than expressions of it. To be sure, they are reactions which can be easily understood and to some extent justified, since they but correct in the field of the theory of knowledge the obvious inadequacies of the physical theory of nature which Galilei and Newton introduced. But modern civilization itself has had its attention on the verified truth of Galilei's and Newton's physics, and not on its shortcomings as a complete philosophy. This truth as traditionally conceived is that nature is a system of masses operated on forces which move them in space and time. In short, the modern world is the fruit of the action of men who have been led *not by an error of the moral judgment* but by

carefully controlled observation and experiment concerning nature to the conclusion that reality is a physical system of masses in motion under the action of forces.

Once this conception of that inexperience which is primary takes hold of the mind of men, is the Industrial Revolution any wonder? And do not the Carnegies and the Fords and Lindberghs become intelligible? If matter and motion are the alpha and omega of existence, then is not he the greatest who achieves the most spectacular triumphs in moving matter about over road or air or ocean?

It was said that the philosophy of Galilei and Newton must be sensed to appreciate America. The point here is that America is the only purely modern culture. Go to Western Europe and you see the modern world thrust within a Medieval background, proceed southward to Italy and one finds it crowded within the Medieval scene which in turn is wedged within an ancient setting. Only in America does the Modern world rest immediately against nature herself. Before anyone begins to criticize let him remember that the modern world rests on verified knowledge, not on an error of the moral judgment, and that it was discovered not by Americans but by an Italian and an Englishman.

One other characteristic of America remains to be noted, namely, its idealism. The hurried traveller who writes most of the books entirely misses this trait. Certain of those foreigners with

deeper insight who stay longer, regard it as one of the countries with most distinguishing characteristics. It is a unique idealism, best to be appreciated by contrasting it with the fatalism that hangs over Europe exactly as her past clings to her. This optimism, this faith that the ideal can be realized, that that which now is does not need to remain; this also, curiously enough, has its root in the physics of Galilei and Newton, notwithstanding the mechanical and deterministic character of that physics.

The key to this paradox centres in the fact that Galilei and Newton gave the world the first philosophy which was stated in terms of the near-at-hand. By doing this they removed man from the position of spectator to the rôle of actor on the great stage of life. The universe was brought down from the heavens where it existed with Plato and to much the same extent with Aristotle, and placed in the hands of man. Man was taught how by putting his hands on masses and forces and by following certain rules, he can change that in his immediate environment which he does not like. Thus optimism and the idea of progress took hold of the mind of man. In no place, because of its more purely modern character, do these concepts rule and flourish as in America. Again if one would understand the differences between a St. Augustine and a Lindbergh one must look to the underlying scientific philosophy of the ages in which they lived.

EAST RAISES A NEW-OLD ISSUE

The same is true of the relation between the East and the West. But here we pass to a very much deeper philosophical and metaphysical issue. It has been noted how the three major periods of Western history are functions of the periods of dominance of the three different possible theories of the relation between the material and formal factors in experience. Thus the differences between the Ages of Western Culture all fall within the issue concerning the relative primacy of matter and form. The difference between the East and the West, on the other hand, falls outside this issue. For the question which the East raises and answers, if I understand its major outlines correctly, in the negative, is whether either material or formal categories are primary at all. If this be true, it is utterly futile to talk about bringing the East and West together in understanding, without first creating a philosophy which provides meaning and vitality for the phases of experience which each treasures as real and all-important. Without this each is talking a philosophical language which the other does not understand, and neither can conceive even in the realm of imagination, of the possibility which the other has actualized in the very foundations of its thought and social institutions. Any attempt, no matter how crude and even erroneous, which throws light on this topic is therefore of

extreme importance, now that international impacts are daily becoming more and more inevitable.

Consider for a moment two characteristics of the East which set it in contrast to the West. The one is its non-temporal character, the other, will be designated more explicitly later, but may be illustrated by the notion of Nirvana.

We have noted how the very essence of the West consists in revolutions in which passage occurs from a civilization with one character to another with a quite different character. Thus modern industrial America is as different from the Middle Ages as the East is from the West. The East, however, as Sarton has pointed out, has a more static character. Although all the types of Western Culture find echoes in varying schools of Eastern thought, the thing which most impresses a Westerner about the East is the extent to which its civilization today, apart from inroads from the West, is like its civilization twenty-five or fifty centuries ago. Whereas, the West seems to be grounded more on the concept of time, the East rests in contemplative repose in the very being of eternity.

The second characteristic of the East is harder to specify. Certainly it is that which the West finds most difficult to appreciate or understand. The average Westerner refers to it as the mysticism of the East. But even then he fails to understand it, for mysticism, unless I am greatly mistaken, is a far different thing

to a Westerner from what it is to a sage of the Orient. For the mysticism of the West inevitably tends to make its experience a determinate experience of a determinate object. But the mysticism of the East, if genuine, is indeterminate and ineffable. And in the experience not merely does all determinateness disappear, but also any object and any subject or self. One is left with bare indeterminate experience itself. One has Nirvana in which all determinateness of experience is *thrown out* and only bare ineffable indeterminate experience remains. One has experience in its bare oneness with its full concreteness, richness and positiveness of actually experienced immediacy, without any of the differentiations and diversifications, and confusing and conflicting opposites and pluralisms which the fullness of naïve experience contains. In short, the East is concentrating its attention in experience on a factor quite different from the physical and formal aspects which have absorbed the thought and activity of the West. This is what was meant above when it was said that *the issue between the East and the West is not the issue between matter and form*. Stated more positively this means that the difference centres in the distinction between the material and formal attributes of reality and some third attribute.

THE PSYCHICAL CATEGORY

Now, curiously enough, an analysis of the factors in imme-

diate experience which the physical and formal categories of Western thought are insufficient to condition, has led the writer, by the method of residues, to the designation of a third phase of reality which it seems proper to term the psychical. Moreover, this psychical factor turns out to be precisely the bare indeterminate experienced quality which we have just designated above as the third phase of experience which the East regards as primary and upon which it concentrates the major emphasis of its attention.

Once these physical, formal and psychical attributes of metaphysical reality are compared with reference to their respective contributions to the full totality of experience, the distinctive features of Eastern and Western culture become somewhat more intelligible. For example, matter and form are many in character, *i.e.*, there are many particles of matter and many different forms. Hence to concentrate on physical and formal categories as the West has done is to be concerned with the differentiating characteristics of experience. Since these are continuously changing and are never exhausted, the West inevitably takes on a restless, unsettled and unsatisfied character. Moreover, since no present specific experience is ever perfect or free from the contradictions and unfulfilled desires which, as Schopenhauer saw, are the fruit of unhappiness and pessimism, this interest in the determinate character of experience results in the continuous at-

tempt to improve the present state, and the endless chase of the ideal type of earthly order which is never realized. It is this interest in the determinate which causes the traveling American to feel ill at ease in a country which does not have the latest plumbing. The Easterner, on the other hand, is more concerned with bare experience itself. He knows to be sure that no naïve experience exists which is not determinate. Of course, an actual naïve experience must have some determinate character but because of his concentration on the psychical,—upon experience as experience and not as this particular experience, the particular determinateness which it has is more or less irrelevant. To the West, however, this concentration on indeterminate experience seems to be the concentration upon nothing. This follows because *the West in its absorption upon physical and formal categories has never grasped the true nature of the psychical.*

Always its handling of this category has been most crude. For it is ever identifying the psychical with a substance that is determinate since it is differentiated from material substance, or else it brings in such confused notions as vital energy or causal psychical factors. Because the material and formal aspects of experience introduce determinateness into experience, the West has fallen into the error of regarding the psychical as determinate also. Thus the concentration of the East upon bare indeterminate experience from

which, as the word Nirvana (to throw out) suggests, all specificity is eliminated, is not understood. But likewise the absorbed attention of the East upon the psychical leads it to deprecate the importance of the physical and formal.

It appears that *each civilization has its truth to deliver*, and that each has tended to exalt its partial conception into the totality of metaphysical reality itself. To-day as the instruments of the West's creation bring East and West into inevitable conjunction, it is the more imperative that each supplements its own attribute of the real with clear conceptions of the category or categories which its neighbour has mastered. Without this there can be no world understanding, no salvaging of the cultures which men have created. For what does not appear to the mind of man as a possibility can never take on actuality in his conduct. Clearly the shortened connections between the nations no longer permit the ideas of one people to remain in the chamber marked ignorance in the mind of the other, for the contact between the East and West is something actual. If the guiding light of that contact is not *mutual* understanding the result will be tragedy. It becomes evident therefore that the primary need of the world to-day is a philosophy which can provide meaning for a conception of experience which gives expression to the primary and true connections of the psychical, physical and formal attributes of reality. In short

the task of world peace is a philosophical undertaking.

Let us not underestimate the magnitude of this task. There are many philosophers to-day who do justice to one or the other of these three primary attributes of reality which the separate civilizations of the earth have discovered. There is no traditional philosophy to my knowledge in either the East or the West which does justice to all three in one consistent system. In Western thought the philosophy of Aristotle came the nearest to this achievement, yet it failed to bring the psychical into an equal position of prominence and emphasis with the physical and the formal, and broke down utterly before the atomic and kinetic nature of matter which modern Western science has unequivocally revealed. Here is the real crux of the entire matter and the starting point from which all Western attacks on this problem must begin. Any philosophical theory which would attempt to bring the East and West together, or which would attempt even to reconcile the various truths of Western thought, without taking the kinetic atomic theory with metaphysical seriousness is simply attempting to destroy the modern world and to ignore the verified empirical evidence upon which it rests. It is from this physical kinetic theory and its consequence that the industrial character of Western civilization flows. To suppose that this phase of civilization can be destroyed is to suppose that reality is not what care-

ful study has revealed it to be. But to suppose likewise, as the Modern West has tended to do, that this is the end of matter is to show a shallowness of philosophical insight and an ignorance of the equally valid discoveries of other peoples and other periods which is equally fatuous. The path of wisdom, at least as approached from the West, obviously is to begin with the current world as it is and to correct its practices where the statements of its truth show those corrections to be necessary. This in the basic realm of theory means to begin with the kinetic atomic theory and to attempt upon such foundations to construct a philosophy which gives equal and proper primacy to monistic, formal and psychical principles.

It happens that the very science which produced this modern

theory finds such changes to be necessary. The writer in the book previously indicated has made a preliminary attempt to indicate what the nature of these changes must be. The result seems to be a radically amended atomic theory which develops into a complete metaphysics in which physical, formal and psychical attributes turn out to be primary in precisely the manner this paper has suggested. Only time can tell whether this suggestion is a genuine solution of our problem. In any event, the fact remains that the task of world understanding entails nothing less than the construction of a new and more catholic metaphysic which will provide man with a theory that gives meaning to, and makes possible the appreciation of, the achievements of his earthly neighbours in time and space.

F. S. C. NORTHROP

A BLIND MAN BUT A KARMA-YOGI

(An Interview)

[N. B. Parulekar, Editor of *Sakal* interviewed Sadashiv Shastri Bhide, a lover of the *Gita* and a founder of the *Gita* Dharma Mandal.—EDS.]

"In the *Gita* you find the waters of philosophy poured into the moulds of practical life. It is an unique piece of literature—its language inimitable, its teaching uplifting and its presentation of the subject, both critical and methodical. This is the best book to give into the hands of those who may care to acquaint themselves with the Hindu view of life."

Such is the estimate of the *Gita* in the words of Sadashiv Shastri Bhide, a philosopher, a seeker, and a religious critic of Maharashtra. He is the founder of the *Gita* Dharma Mandal whose object is to propagate the teaching of the *Gita*. He is the author of many books and is known from Bombay to Benares as a religious thinker. My visit proved unusually enlightening.

"How did you happen to be attracted to the *Gita*? Was there any special occasion or experience in your life which compelled you to go to it?"

"As you see," replied Bhide Shastri, "for the last forty-six years I have been going without eyes. Smallpox snatched away the sight almost overnight. I was a boy of seven. It was a curious experience. It made me feel older, more mature. My childhood days suddenly disappeared. However the

very pressure of the unhappy event opened out a possibility. People in general do not seem to realise the value of what they possess until they are stripped of their possessions. We are afraid to try a different way because we are wedded to a particular one. In trying to rally my mental resources I discovered the way to substitute meditation and systematic memorising in place of eyes. In other words I began to see in my head.

"I studied Sanskrit in the old Shastri manner, by rote and by discussions. My knowledge began to increase by leaps and bounds. Soon it became evident that one cannot go on accumulating knowledge without a system to organise it for definite use. How to organise the incoming tide of information was my problem. I needed the discretion to judge and to assimilate.

"That difficulty was solved by the advice of a Sadhu who told me to study Vedanta. I did. I can say from experience that the study of Vedanta is the best organiser of knowledge, because it introduces us to the ultimate measure of all sciences. From Vedanta I was inevitably led to the *Gita* which is Vedanta brought into the business of life. This truth was emphasized in the *Gita-Rahasya*

by Lokamanya Tilak. Tilak showed, against the weight of the orthodox authorities, that the *Gita* is *Pravṛttipara* and not *Nivṛttipara* as the traditional commentators and their orthodox followers made it appear. That is, the teaching of the *Gita* definitely exalts a life of activity for *Lokasangraha* or the well-being of the people."

"But then," I asked, "the general impression is that there are various paths described in the *Gita*. Which of them do you think is the path that Krishna definitely advocates?"

"The *Gita* presents at the outset the winding ways of mankind. Good many people recognise the futility of trying to possess everything. So they choose and undergo hardships, follow certain ways calculated to reach their goal. These are the different goods of life—from coarse pleasures to most cultivated pursuits. Krishna says that though one may attain such particular ends in proportion to one's faith and perseverance, yet they are all born of illusion; it makes us forget that their enjoyment is exhaustible and such exhaustion brings disappointment.

"On the other hand the path of the *Gita* is the path to universal intelligence. The *Gita* puts you at the centre of the world rather than at its periphery. Our passions, petty desires, and general covetousness to own the fruits of our pursuits continuously deflect us from the path of wisdom, and rob us of that calm insight which alone is able to discriminate the really

worthwhile from the worthless. If you attain to that stage of discretion, and cultivate a detached attitude towards the enjoyment of the fruits of your conduct, you find yourself free. Then you continue doing the duties of life without getting involved in them. The *Gita* describes in eloquent words the life of true freedom. It posits the life of fruitful activity as against the life of an ascetic. It gives a decided preference to Karma-Yogi or the wise man who walks the ramifying ways of the world in the spirit of divine detachment. He works for the good of all creatures without a desire to possess the fruits for himself. Such a life cannot be lived in the woods. The *Gita* teaches Karma-Yoga or the path of detachment in action."

"You said that the philosophy of the *Gita* is the philosophy of Vedant. Can you tell me whether the *Gita* tries at the same time to reconcile other schools?"

"It takes up other systems of philosophy, shears them of their particular biases and converts them to strengthen its own conclusions. From Yoga it takes parts which are helpful in concentrating and elevating the mind and prescribes them as discipline to the Karma-Yogi. It takes from the Sankhya Philosophy the theory of Purusha and Prakriti to describe the relation between the Self and the not-self. Also it profits itself from the Guna-Vichar or the consideration of qualities which fashion the world of particulars. It considers Bhaktimarga or the

path of devotion to direct all activity to the one universal end, instead of appropriating its fruits for the sake of the agent himself. In the Upanishads the Vedanta philosophy is expressed in terms of speculative experiences—you see the heights of philosophy as you may behold from a distance the heights of Himalaya without seeing a possible way to reach them. The result is that these experiences stand isolated from us as ideal moments of an ideal soul, as dreams of another life far different and far difficult for us. But the *Gita* shows in a practical way how to reach those heights in one's own experience. It tells in exact words how to work out that philosophy of Vedanta—the end of all knowledge—in the experience of one's own life."

"Supposing," said I, "one is impressed by the example of the life of Karma-Yogi as described in the *Gita* and wants to reach that ideal—what are the qualifications and virtues which one should practise and how?"

"It is an old story. The *Gita* has a convincing answer. Krishna says that most people live in a state of forgetfulness. They surround themselves with a world of illusion created by the senses which continue to attract them to their particular pleasures. They are not critical. They behave like children beguiled by sense-pleasures. Even in studying the physical world the scientist refuses to take the findings of the senses at their face value. He checks them by a number of devices and

verifies the conclusions before admitting their validity. In the spiritual life the senses must be regarded a hundredfold more deceitful. By controlling them, says Krishna, the intelligence is rendered sharp, serene and soul-lifting.

"There is another source of illusion—that created by our covetousness. We desire to possess the enjoyment which the objects give. If one gets rid of the feeling of proprietorship over the fruits of one's pursuits, then, over-coming sins, one passes beyond. To be imbued with this freedom of self from the senses and then to be doing the duties of life in the spirit of sacrifice is the path of Nishkāma Karma, i. e., action without coveting its fruits."

Naturally, the question came uppermost to my mind why such a book with its inspiration and unerring guidance for men should have been lost for centuries. Was it suppressed? How did it remain without touching the minds of people during several centuries? The answer of Bhide Shastri is that the *Gita* was neither lost nor suppressed. On the contrary ever since its appearance over four thousand years ago, it has been among the most revered books of the Hindu religion. But when the wave of ascetic abandon spread over the minds of people the *Gita* fell the first victim. Its teaching was buried under a heap of commentaries. Learned men read into the *Gita* the melancholy spirit of their age and wrote commentaries saying that the *Gita* preached a life of *Sanyāsa* or an ascetic seclu-

sion. They have now started to read the *Gita* in its original and feel once again its eternal urge for action in inaction and inaction in action.

"But then would it not be merely pouring old wine into new bottles? Has the *Gita* any specific message for our generation in India? Supposing the message of the *Gita* has been popularly known during these centuries and practised by the masses, would the story of India be different? Wherein exactly should the *Gita* touch our life to-day? What did the people of India lose in not recognizing its message for so long?"

"Of course," said Bhide Shastri, "the message of the *Gita* is particularly fitting to our present conditions. The *Gita* tells how in the scheme of life the individual and the society should fit in with each other and how man cannot save himself while ignoring his fellows. In the present stage of India when caste is crumbling, and old social limitations are falling under the pressure of circumstances, and when we are once again facing the problem of a new social reconstruction, to my mind the teaching of the *Gita* points out *the* way to us. It asks you to be wise as an individual and worthwhile as a social being. It points out that the greatest problem in life is to understand the possibilities of one's soul and to utilise them for social well-being, remaining all the while detached from the fruits of one's own conduct. There are limitations in this life which scare us and

throw us off our feet. But then, says Krishna, the sacrificial fire has its smoke. Build a fire that has as little smoke, and let it out without being choked by it. A life that is profound as that of a philosopher and yet is keenly alive to the smallest of details in conduct is the life of a *Mukta* or a spiritually free man. In fact the very propriety of the *Gita* was to enlighten Arjuna who, frightened by the duties of a prince, wanted to get away from men and sink into the life of a private individual. Krishna says, you cannot avoid your obligations. On the other hand through a life of deep understanding and detached activity raise the world to the plane of salvation."

"Had we practised the philosophy of the *Gita* India would not have been a conquered country during the last fifteen hundred years, submitting itself to wholesale slavery. It would have been a different story. Our folks would have been freer in their thinking, more courageous in their conduct, more fruitful in their endeavours. The lofty philosophy of India would have had a chance to vindicate itself in the lives of its people. We might have had both the individual and the society progressively uplifting each other."

Our conversation turned on religion and its many symbols in the form of temples and shrines. Do people get any worthwhile religion out of such places? Bhide Shastri believes that these places are useful as reminders which should help to take you bodily

into different surroundings at least for the time being. But most people visit these places either as a routine or in the spirit of bargaining. They want to be favoured, to be promoted in their pursuits or to be forgiven for their sins—all of which they hope to get from going to the temples with so many offerings! They are idle and their religion is a kind of make believe. However we do need temples as we need good associations, and for some it is a good practice to visit a temple daily and to meditate there for a few minutes.

According to him India at present is passing through a transition period and people's minds are extremely unsettled. "We have to pass," he said, "through a period of activity—like the period of pioneers in America, or like Europe when it was busy with industrial revolution, building itself anew after the wreckage of

the feudal system and the papal religion. Out of this re-making must come *our* philosophy. *We can neither be imitators of the West nor mere borrowers of the ancients.* I feel that our ancient philosophy and culture can give a good start; with that initial experience, leaving authority alone, and trying to find the truth within ourselves, we will be able to work out our own salvation. Then we may be able to contribute something for the rest of the world. To that end it will be necessary that we possess a sharp and self-purified intelligence coupled with a constant endeavour to labour and live in the interest of humanity. Situated as we are under similar conditions the philosophy of the *Gita* can guide us as nothing else can."

It was already late. I thanked Bhide Shastri and took leave of him.

N. B. PARULEKAR

HINDU HERBS

In reference to our introductory note to Mr. H. Stanley Redgrove's review article in April ARYAN PATH in which we ask if some Indian Pandit will write a reliable volume on Indian Herbs-*Aushadhis*, a correspondent sends us the following from H. P. Blavatsky's *Theosophical Glossary*:—

"OSHADI PRASTHA (*Sk.*) *Lit.*, 'the place of medicinal herbs'. A mysterious city in the Himalayas mentioned even from the Vedic period. Tradition shows it as once inhabited by sages, great adepts in the healing art, who used only herbs and plants, as did the ancient Chaldees. The city is mentioned in the *Kumāra Sambhava* of Kalidasa."

RELIGION AND SOCIAL SERVICE

[Lawrence Hyde wrote in our January number on "From Authority to Inspiration".

This article discusses a vital problem—socializing of religion. Theology has crushed the mystic element in every creed and has made religion a mockery. Large numbers of people practise religion in social service, and are disappointed; because, their efforts, when not barren, produce but new puzzles and problems. Theosophy is but a religious creed for not a very small number, and they encounter the same disappointment in doing *their* "good works". To them, as to all others who "must rush madly or boldly out to do, to do," the pregnant thought of Mr. Hyde brings a remedy:

"The attempts which are made by the more materialistic thinker to deal with concrete problems without first developing a spiritual consciousness are always doomed to failure."

Our civilization has to learn this lesson—Mere altruistic activity, however laudable, can never take the place of religion which must contain philosophy to satisfy the intellect and purify the emotions, and mysticism to raise thoughts and feelings to the plane of genuine philanthropy.—EDS.]

We are living in an age in which men find themselves confronted with the appalling possibility that the whole structure of their civilization may collapse before their eyes. It is not therefore surprising that the attention of even those people who are normally disinclined to occupy themselves with "serious thought" should to-day be centred upon such subjects as economics, sociology and political science. For, until we have somehow devised a stable material foundation for our communal life it is clearly idle to propose to ourselves more elevated aims.

This unhappy state of affairs is not only presenting a grave problem to the purely secular thinker: it involves also a challenge to the religious believer. For one of the major objects of religion, and of Western religion in particular, is that of realising the Kingdom of

Heaven on Earth. And what is actually being realised at the moment is something more appropriate to an infernal régime. Hence we find in modern religious thought a powerful movement towards the "socializing" of Christianity. That it is from one point of view an extremely salutary development is evident enough. But it raises inevitably the whole problem of the relation between social and individual regeneration—a problem with which the majority of those who are working in this field only rarely come definitely to grips.

I

It is clear at the outset that as far as this particular issue goes the intelligent Christian is rightly stricken with a sense of remorse. The dynamic of social reform during the last half century has been provided in a large measure

by people for whom the limited ideal of humanitarianism was infinitely more suggestive than any furnished by religion. In turning his attention to social problems the Christian thinker is for the most part only following a lead which has been given him by those who do not in other respects share his aspirations and beliefs. Further, this re-orientation has been precipitated by another realisation of no less serious import—the realisation that the spiritual life of the ordinary Christian has become somehow inordinately introverted, distinguished by an unattractive piety and religiosity which find no vital expression on the plane of actuality. The type of discipline which has been encouraged by the Churches seems to make for a curious and disappointing dissociation from the world of concrete reality.

The reaction is as healthy as it is inevitable. But at the same time it opens the door, paradoxically enough, to a subtle type of materialism. For the religious thinker who is animated by this desire to get down to "realities" is in serious danger of perverting in the process the proper function of religion. So much so, indeed, that this propagation of the "social gospel" of Christ has already called forth a vigorous counter-affirmation from the theologians of the Barthian school. They insist that in one very important sense religion has absolutely nothing to do with schemes for social reconstruction or with practical mea-

sures for reform. Society might conceivably be perfectly organized economically and yet still be disastrously alienated from the Divine. The fundamental problems lie altogether beyond the plane of space and time. The supreme object before us is that of attaining to Eternal Life, which is completely different in quality from our ordinary mundane existence. The world is by its very nature corrupt, unreal, impermanent. Our concern with it is essentially of a secondary order. And so on, in a style which betrays curious affinities with the thought of the East. It is all valuable enough in its way—and would be very much more so were it not inseparably associated with an almost fanatic adherence to an uncompromisingly Christocentric scheme of salvation of an oppressively Protestant type.

II

Nevertheless the stress laid by the Barthian theologians on the element of "otherworldness" in religion is valuable and timely enough. For the progress of modern social reform is bringing out more and more clearly the fact that the attempts which are made by the more materialistic thinker to deal with concrete problems without first developing a spiritual consciousness are always doomed to failure. This comes out in a variety of ways. In the first place, the earnest social reformer is usually basing his activities on an attitude to experience which is known philosophically

as "naïve realism". That is to say, he takes life at its face value, does not pause to enquire why the objects with which he is dealing should exist at all, what ultimate aim, if any, is achieved by perfecting them, or in what relation he himself stands to them. It never occurs to him, for instance, to consider whether it is intrinsically desirable that social conditions should be improved at all; such metaphysical speculations he is apt to dismiss as being idle and far-fetched. The attitude works well enough while it lasts. But there is always the possibility that the individual's zest may one day fail, that all this vehement activity will suddenly and mysteriously lose its savour for him, and that he will pay the penalty which attaches to being of the "once-born" rather than of the "twice-born" type. And inevitably at some point in the course of the soul's evolution this peculiar disillusion and sense of futility must be experienced. *For until the man has found himself within he cannot effectively relate himself to the world without.* In the language of modern psychology, the only sound basis for extraversion lies in an antecedent introversion. Or, in religious terms, the self within must be securely possessed before the spirit can act creatively upon the not-self to which it is opposed.

The truth is that the naïve extravert, for all his apparent "objectivity," is really far more at the mercy of his psychological inhibitions than is the man whose

thoughts are turned inwards. A great deal of his material activity, so far from being creative, represents in point of fact the "projection" upon his environment of conflicts which he has failed to resolve within his own being. He is really compensating for a basic disinclination to face the humble and work-a-day, but infinitely more urgent and vital, problems which are presented to him by his intimate, personal life. Hence that curious combination of unhealthy excitement and internal emptiness which is so often engendered by work in this field, and which in the end resolves itself into profound disillusion and depression.

III

Nor is this all. Not only is the individual of this type psychologically bound; he is also notably ineffective—the inescapable nemesis for attacking the problem of social reform at the wrong end. His efforts never seem to produce any really substantial results—as is being forcibly brought home to us to-day by the signal failure of our purely secular thinkers to set our unhappy modern world straight. The person who has not begun by finding his centre in the All One will infallibly lack the inspiration required to solve the material problems with which he is seeking to deal. All his planning, however resourceful and ingenious, will ultimately lead to nothing—for the reason that he is not inwardly attuned to that Universal Mind which is the unique source of all orderly and creative thought.

This, one suspects, is one of the main reasons why all the great spiritual teachers have always stressed the fact that all social regeneration begins with the individual. The point is not simply that an inner quickening of the spirit will increase man's power to do "good" on the level on which he was doing it before. That is, indeed, an important element in the situation. But there is also to be reckoned with the fact that this interior vitalization makes also for a heightening of the natural faculties, and this not only in relation to those more elevated questions which occupy the attention of the spiritually-minded person, but in relation also to the most concrete and objective problems of material life. This is a fact which needs urgently to be emphasized. For it is the common opinion that the awakening of the spiritual faculties in man make pre-eminently for a concern with the more exalted and mystical aspects of being. To be "spiritual" is to be etherealized, contemplative, remote, withdrawn, unsullied by the world. This certainly applies to one very important aspect of the mystic's life; he must constantly retire within for replenishment. Yet it is no less true that in the case of the mystic who expresses himself most characteristically in *action* (who, in terms of Eastern philosophy, is following the path of Karma-Yoga) his spiritual unfoldment will manifest itself before everything in what might be described as a genius for practical reform.

He will be able to act socially with infinitely greater discernment than he did before, to take measures which are creative in a far deeper sense than is apparent to the unilluminated eye, to lay down his plans with a sureness and foresight beyond any which are attainable by the person who is dealing with the problem by the light of his native understanding alone. Harmonized with the creative Mind of the Universe, he will necessarily be moved to introduce a basic order and unity into his surroundings.

IV

The fact that the character of the outward and the manifested is determined by the invisible and the spiritual is, however, never properly appreciated by the more rationalistic type of reformer. For he tends always to identify reality with those objects which are presented to him by his physical senses. It is upon them that his thoughts and feelings are primarily centred. He is inordinately preoccupied with the visible aspect of things, and correspondingly insensitive to that elusive and interior world of spiritual being of which it is the outer expression. He may even go so far as to "have no use for" religion, although it does not need much perspicacity to see that the religious attitude of the individual must in the end provide the key to the whole problem. Behind the factory, the research laboratory, the commercial treaty, there is a complex of ideas which provide the matrix

for their physical manifestation. Behind the ideas are a collection, of emotional preferences—for the mind is in this connection an instrument for objectifying the ideals which the soul has found acceptable. And behind these ideals again is the spiritual attitude of the individual—that which renders him responsive to this ideal, apathetic to that.

It is upon this ultimate attitude of the soul that the specific influences of religion are directed—so that in the last analysis it is upon religion that all else depends. But to live up to this realisation is for the majority of men extremely difficult. Their imagination and will-power are liable to falter unless they can maintain before their minds some visible and concrete objective such as those which are provided for them by the scientist, the eugenicist, the sociologist and the politician. Those subtle but potent influences which work within the depths of the spirit seem to them to be too

insubstantial and evasive to have any vital function in transforming reality; they are too impatient to accept the notion that the foundation of the Kingdom of Heaven on Earth should be laid in the last resort by the solution of an infinity of minor, private, domestic problems of a wearisome and seemingly insignificant order. Yet it is precisely in terms of such apparently trivial situations that the individual is spiritually educated, and the process is all the more arduous because it provides no basis either for that sensationalism on which the soul of the average reformer so eagerly feeds, or for the contemplation of chimerical and grandiose vistas. Instead the individual is called upon to leave his appetite for facile emotions unsatisfied, to live upon dry bread, and to build slowly and unobtrusively in the silence. Yet this, as the wise have always insisted, is the only sure foundation for the regeneration of Society.

LAWRENCE HYDE

It takes a very wise man to do good works without danger of doing incalculable harm; one such might by his great intuitive powers know whom to relieve and whom to leave in the mire that is their best teacher. The poor and wretched themselves will tell anyone who is able to win their confidence what disastrous mistakes are made by those who come from a different class and endeavour to help them. Kindness and gentle treatment will sometimes bring out the worst qualities of a man or woman who has led a fairly presentable life when kept down by pain and despair. The Gita teaches that the causes of misery do not lie in conditions or circumstances, but in the mistaken ideas and actions of the man himself; he reaps what he has sown in ignorance. A better knowledge of the nature of man and the purpose of life is needed; as this is acquired, the causes of misery are gradually eliminated. No greater charity can be bestowed upon suffering humanity than right knowledge that leads to right action.

—ROBERT CROSBIE (*Notes on the Bhagavad-Gita*, pp. 221-222)

FREE WILL IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

[Prof. G. R. Malkani is already known to our readers. Last month in publishing Prof. C. E. M. Joad's "Free Will and Modern Psychology" we promised the Hindu view-point, on the subject of fate and free-will. Next month we will publish an interesting consideration of the same subject by Mr. J. D. Beresford who examines the views of some prominent men of science.—EDS.]

It is sometimes supposed that Hindoo thought does not favour the freedom of the will. But this is a mistake. The freedom of the will is not only an ethical postulate with the Hindoos, based on an analysis of ethical facts; it is directly deducible from their metaphysics or their view of Reality as Spirit. *The spirit is essentially free; it is freedom itself; and if something appears to determine it and involve it in the cycle of cause and effect, the spirit is competent to counteract that something and escape from the cycle.* In fact nothing can determine spirit except through its own assent. This assent can be given as well as withdrawn. In embodied existence of the spirit, we naturally find that this assent is given to the body and the bodily cravings. The spirit is so far bound. It is determined. This bondage of the body is the cause of all its unhappiness. Still it is a bondage that is self-imposed; and it is the goal of every spiritual being to remove this bondage, and realize its true natural freedom. Almost all systems of Indian thought therefore consider the highest goal of the spirit to consist in a final escape from the cycle of birth and death, in short, from

all embodied existence which is synonymous with pain.

Schopenhauer has much in common with Indian thought. Still there is an important difference. For Schopenhauer blind and unconscious will is the driving power of life. It is the creative force in nature. It is the ultimate reality. According to Indian thought, this blind will itself can only be operative under the influence of what may be called cosmic ignorance. We find in individual life that the will operates only under the idea that something is good and something is bad. Things appear good and bad because there is the false notion that happiness comes from them. This false notion arises because of our identification with the body through which alone we are related to the things. Thus we find that the driving power of the will comes from the erroneous idea that we are the body and that the body is our self. Ultimately, it is this ignorance that alone accounts for those operations of the blind will which constitute the greatest bondage and the source of all unhappiness for the spirit, which in itself is quite free. The ultimate reality is spirit, and its only bondage is ignorance.

But although ignorance is the ultimate cause of all our unhappiness, it does not account for the actual suffering of each separate individuality. What accounts for this is individual Karma, or the sum-total of past actions. Our present existence with all its handicaps and opportunities is the result of our past actions. The question might arise, what made the past? The answer is that the past was made by an earlier past, and so on *ad infinitum*. Evidently then there can be no beginning to Karma. It is said to be *anādi* or beginningless.*

The spirit is in and by nature free. Its bondage is the bondage of desire, *i. e.*, the result of past actions or Karma. True freedom can only be realised through release from Karma. This release comes from enlightenment. It is indeed often thought that knowledge by itself is not sufficient to make us free. We must act rightly. The will must be in accord with our knowledge. But it will be found that the will in the end is governed by knowledge. If we sometimes act against our better judgment or choose what we perceive to be the lesser good, it is only because our understanding is still clouded. If we have a clear perception of a certain course of action to be of greater advantage to ourselves, we cannot but will that course. On the other hand, if we know that a course of action is positively detrimental to us, we can never deliberately choose it. Nobody

ever puts his hand in fire, knowing that it will burn.

The will is free in the measure of our knowledge. What we do blindly and thoughtlessly, we do impelled by desire and the momentum of habit. We do not know what we do. We cease to be really alive. We are possessed by inertia. We have no spontaneity and no freedom. We are no longer creative. It is knowledge or enlightenment that releases power in the individual, removes from life the shackles of habit and inertia, and makes for greater freedom. It has indeed to be admitted that this clear understanding of things is not possible unless we have passed through the crucible of action, made bad choices, suffered their fruit, and seen things for ourselves. But action without knowledge is blind. It is knowledge alone that will ultimately make us free. *What is called training of the will is nothing but intelligent persuasion through discriminative thinking. The power in action that comes from knowledge goes to work with the same ease with which water flows to a lower level.* We wrongly identify the greater power of the will with greater strain and effort. It is just the opposite. The man of power is perfectly self-possessed. He is at peace with himself. He does things most easily and naturally.

The law of Karma does not mean, as it is sometimes interpreted to mean, inexorable fate. Fate

is indeed real and inexorable, but only as it has been made by us in the past. The chains that bind us are the chains that we ourselves have made. But what we can make, we can also unmake. We are free in the present. The future is not determined by the past. It is determined by the present. Indeed we cannot be absolutely free in the present. Absolute freedom is the goal to be achieved and not a present fact. We are free only to modify and direct the course of destiny. Each individual is born in certain circumstances over which, it seems, he has no control. His education, his bringing up, his whole environment are more or less determined for him. Still he has a real choice, when he is not wholly submerged under the forces of desire and of past tradition. It may be a restricted freedom, the freedom of opportunity; nevertheless it is real. The past is no longer ours. But we possess the present, and also the future in so far as it is contained in the present. It is wrong to suppose that we are wholly determined, and can do nothing to change what the so called fate has ordained for us.

It has been said that it is necessary for freedom of choice that the elimination of past influences should be sometimes achieved. But we do not think that such elimination is possible, or even that it is desirable. But for the past history of the individual, there will be no continuity of growth. Growth involves conservation as well as transformation.

A mere freakish choice will have no relation to our personality; it will be quite useless. There is no value in a free choice if it cannot be worked into our personality and made a part of it. *What thus seems to hamper freedom through the determining force of the past is found to be a way to real freedom.*

A choice once made cannot be revoked. We shall have to suffer the fruit. But this suffering cannot be endless. When we have gone through the suffering that is appropriate to the moral quality of our act, we are no longer bound by the original choice. We have paid for it in our lives. Our new choice is comparatively free. The suffering has chastened and unbound us. It has prepared us for a freer choice. Suffering is the only means to wisdom, and so to freedom. It has a great spiritual value. It would be monstrous to suppose that the punishment of our deeds which awaits us will be eternal, without any hope of redemption. Eternal and endless punishment is not only psychologically impossible, but ethically barbarous and unjustifiable. Once we have paid for the deed in suffering, we are free.

There is indeed the possibility of bad choices leading to renewed bad choices, and good choices leading to renewed good choices. It is for such cases, seasoned sinners and seasoned saints, that heaven and hell have been invented. Slight deviations from the path of righteousness do not need strong measures of correction.

* Avidya also is said to be *anādi*. How far this answer is satisfactory has been considered by me in a book on *Ajnana* or *Ignorance* which is now in the press.

But *the hue of our character is a more permanent thing*; hence the notion of a comparatively permanent abode of correction or of enjoyment. But no one can be said to be lost for ever. Nor can any one be said to have got redemption till he has become completely desireless.

This brings us to the great ethical distinction between the ideals of the East and the ideals of the West. It is often a charge levelled against the East by Western thinkers that its ethics is negative. The thinkers of the East on the other hand regard Western ideals of morality as simply leading to what is called more *samsara* or a worldly kind of existence. An action is judged highest in Hindoo philosophy, when it is performed without any desire for fruit whatsoever. Such an act is a truly free act. It does not bind the agent. An action, on the other hand, is judged highest in the West when it serves the highest purpose. But since no one has ever any clear idea as to what is the highest purpose, it is enough if a certain course of action satisfies the ethical conscience or the traditional code of morality. The ten commandments of the Old Testament and the ethical teaching of the New Testament set the standard. As against this we find in the *Gita* an actual injunction to Arjuna to fight the battle in accordance with his *Sva-dharma*, but only to do so without any desire for fruit. The highest excellence in action is the complete desirelessness with which it is per-

formed. Thus an apparently sinful act can be a most free act; while on the other hand an apparently moral act may still be a shackle upon the spirit.

It is often thought that freedom involves creativeness. Creativeness means in general "bringing something into being which did not exist before". In a sense, all forms of higher activity in which a choice is made after a dispassionate consideration of the principles involved, are creative. One is conscious of freely bringing something into being. But creativeness is often understood in a more radical sense. It is the sense in which blind and unconscious will was supposed by Schopenhauer to be creative and God is supposed in Christian tradition to have created the world. But even then one thing is certain. The divine act may be truly creative; but what is created can never have a real and independent existence. The act is free, but not what it brings about. The latter can only have a dependent existence. What the will can make out of its freedom, it can also unmake. It is free both to put forth as well as to withdraw. It is wrong to attribute one-sided activity to it. It creates and also destroys. It is this dual activity that truly proves the freedom of the spirit. The latter is not bound by what it has once created. It can also destroy. Hindoo philosophy thus attributes to Deity not only the creative function, but also the sustaining and the destroying functions, thereby demon-

strating its complete freedom in respect of the world which it itself has made.

The freedom of the will must be distinguished from the freedom of the spirit. What is truly and absolutely free is the spirit. The exercise of this freedom under certain limiting conditions is what we understand by the freedom of the will. These limiting conditions can ultimately be traced simply to desire. It is evident that will is not desire, though desire is certainly implied in it. We may desire something, but not will it. But when we will we certainly also desire. With will is associated the notion of "power to bring about what is desired". In a sense power is inalienable from reality; and will is simply the actual functioning of this power. The exercise of this power, in the case of the individual, is dependent upon the circumstances in which he finds himself placed and in which there is a call for him to act. The supreme spirit

is not thus externally determined. It is not conditioned by any circumstances outside itself. It makes its own circumstances. Still it is determined from within in that, that there can be no occasion for the exercise of its power unless there is desire. "I want to be many," "I want to show myself forth," etc., these are some of the forms of divine desire.* The freedom of the will is thus necessarily conditioned freedom. It is not absolute freedom which belongs to the spirit only. The exercise of freedom is bound up with a thinking appreciation of things. There must be thought and there must be evaluation. Where both thought and values are transcended, there can be no scope for the exercise of freedom. The spirit is freedom itself. The freedom of the will is subordinate to it; it is the lower freedom that in the words of Hindoo thought has scope only within the realm of *avidya*.

G. R. MALKANI

Karma is the adjustment of effects flowing from causes, during which the being upon whom and through whom that adjustment is effected experiences pain or pleasure.

Karma is an undeviating and unerring tendency in the Universe to restore equilibrium, and it operates incessantly.

—Aphorisms 2 and 3 on Karma. W. Q. JUDGE
(*Overcoming Karma*, U. L. T. Pamphlet—No. 21)

* H. P. Blavatsky's *Theosophical Glossary* under Kamadeva.—Eds.

THE PROBLEM OF THE 'MAN' AS BECOMING

[Mrs. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, the great authority on Pali texts and Buddhist lore concludes her fascinating study of how soul-unfoldment was understood, in the era when Sakyamuni began His Mission, taking up the thread of the elder Upanishads. We heartily endorse our author's concluding appeal for the restoration in modern Buddhism of the true concept of Man, the Soul, which the Buddha must have taught.]

The Esoteric Science has its own explanation about the real Upanishadic lore, how its knowledge was acquired by the Buddha, and what transpired thereafter—the struggle between the Brahmana-orthodoxy and Buddhism. Readers will find that pp. 271-2 of *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. I, throw great light on the subject. —EDS.]

II

It is hardly to be wondered at, that we outside readers have failed to see as yet, something that was pressing for utterance, pressing between the years B. C. 600 to 500. Can we now light upon that 'something' in the world of religious ideas and aspirations?

I surely think we can; thus: In this new preference for forms of the word 'become,' when the older, or at least more usual 'be' would have sufficed, we are not merely concerned with an attempt to express some social, political, ethical or even philosophical change in North India. We are up against a religious change, and one of the deepest significance. In those early Upanishads we find ourselves in a world of teachers who are profoundly convinced of the truth in a new mandate, a mandate *not originally* put forward by them—the name of the man who did that is alas! not one that "liveth for evermore"—but which they are exercising their imagination about, developing, amplifying, vindicating.

This new mandate was, that man has it in his nature, by becoming more, to "become That" Who he essentially is. At present he is far from actually being It. They had no word for 'potential,'—we owe that to Aristotle—or they would probably have used it. At first the teaching was, that to be as (*iva*), God, man had to 'know' this essential unity of nature. This, if it seem feeble to us, is because for us the idea of 'knowing' (involving what we now call 'will'*) was a very tremendous thing for the early Indian mind.

But there seems to emerge a feeling after something to endorse and vitalize the 'knowing'. To express this, there was the word *vardh*, meaning quantitative increase as growth and this was in a way not good enough. We do meet much with it in the Pali scriptures, work largely of later wording, and with other words too for growth: *virūhi*, *vepulla*, derived from the plant world. But in those scriptures the greater

stronger word 'become,' *bhava*, was undergoing a very chequered history, and therein becoming worsened. No such rebuff had yet befallen the word *bhū*, *bhava* in the earlier Upanishads. It was, as applied to the very man, new, for the idea of the very real as just 'being' has ever dominated the Indian, both before this period and since. But just then a stirring had come in these static waters, and for 'being' there was a tendency to substitute 'movement-in-being'.

This was in a way forced upon them by the tremendous religious change from the conception of Deity, as external to man, to immanent Deity. For man to conceive himself, not as only creature of Deity, not even as son of Deity, but as in his bed-rock nature, very Deity there must go, with this terrific act of faith, an imperious sense of the need in him to be growing less unlike That of whom he is but at the best a tender shoot. The one attitude that can possibly justify the faith is the sister-faith, that he can become, become to an unlimited degree, and the *confession of the will to become*. So may we, in a long perspective of time, interpret the reason of this preoccupation with 'becoming' in those brahman teachers.

Or do you say: Was not then and there the idea of the Highest, the Perfect so far lower, cruder than it became later, that identity of nature with Deity was more

plausible than it would now be? I would reply, that in the early Upanishads those lower cruder conceptions of Deity, such as we find, not in a primitive degree, but to a relatively un-moral degree in the Vedas, have been discarded. Previous to our date Zarathustra had lived and taught in Persia, taught a morally lofty conception of Deity as the Good word, Good deed, Good thought, and, by ways of which we have no clear record this New Word had infected Indian religious thought, leaving both a general uplift and other traces in Upanishadic and early Buddhist teaching. In the brahman books, God, *i. e.* Brahman, was conceived as eternal wisdom, truth, happiness, dearness, steadfastness:—terms in which an approximately perfect man of that day would be described. (And in the Buddhist Suttas we come up continually against the triad of good or bad deed, word and thought. Nor is the supposedly perfect man conceived in any but equally lofty terms.)

It is not, I think, by narrowing the tremendous gap between the Highest and the earthly human self, that we shall rightly value the Upanishad teaching. The fact that the gap was, if not worded, felt, and that to bridge it remained a practical task, let alone a problem,*—this it is that we must keep in view. Teachers told their hearers: Thou art That, meaning that *au fond* and ultimately man's nature is God's

* I mean that 'knowing' included 'purpose'.

* So Prof. S. Radhakrishnan: "The God-in-man was a task as well as a problem,"—*Studies in the Upanishads*.

nature. How man was to make the potential actual was variously taught, but there were neither these terms, nor a word for the tremendous *responsibility* involved in the teaching. Nor do I want to force modern ideas into a teaching in which are no adequate words for those ideas. But I contend that new ideas *may arise when there is a lack of fit words*; when there are only words which old ideas have evolved. And I contend, that one such new idea was the sense that to know one's innate unity with the Divine, even in the Indian meaning of the verb, was being felt (if not so worded) as not enough; and that the importance of living the 'known' was stirring the teachers. And so, whereas in the Upanishads, the vital importance of knowing, of coming-to-know man's oneness with the Highest finds full and varied expression, and indeed conveys a will-power foreign to our term, the yet more vital importance of so living, that he is ever becoming a less glaring inconsistency with himself-as-what-he-may-be is, because it was new, far less clearly worded. It is only, I repeat, *felt after* in this: that a man 'is' only in so far as he 'becomes'.

But that this feeling-after was no more after-thought to be played with you can see if you ponder the passages where it attains deepest significance. This is where Becoming is seen as an attribute of Deity Itself-in-action, in creation. Here we find not just the fiat uttered: "Let there be," or

become . . . We find the Divine Artist Himself as becoming. Oneness is—poetically no doubt—felt as unsufficing:—"Let me bring forth Myself." It sought from being One to become many; till this was accomplished, It did not "become this and that":—here we get *bhū* as a compound with the disintegrating prefix *vi: na vya-bhavat*: 'did not develop'. Becoming is here no longer a state of progress from a more imperfect to a less imperfect, as in the potential or actual becoming of the human self. It is raised to the higher level which we see anticipated in the work of such a man as we call a genius. Becoming is in such to be rather described as a becoming-other, a becoming a new manifold, as it were in divine play. And this, at a much later date, was the very way in which the Indian thinker regarded divine operations, as when Rāmānuja dedicates his Commentary to that "highest Brahman . . . who in play produces, sustains and re-absorbs the entire universe".

At that later date, it is true, the earlier idea of Deity Itself becoming over and in Its creating had been repudiated. But in those earlier days it had been a bold word, in which man was seeing, in the Highest as then conceived, the best and noblest that he saw in himself, as something of which he was, at least ultimately, capable and heir. And more: not only would he, as essentially one with Deity, become, as was That, immortal: his becoming would not stop there

and then.

I mention the word 'immortal,' because we see the teaching in the Upanishads struggling to make it man's birthright, but hindered by the older tradition, which taught that man must win that right, not then held as innate, by sacrifice and ritual while on earth, and by vicarious rites after he had left earth. No phrase is more frequent than "the mortal becoming immortal" in these books (and here at least no translator can shirk the word!). Bold here too was the new teaching, undermining one great claim made by brahmans to the monopoly of the ritual. Yet was the new teaching consistent, if we concede the force there will have been in the word 'become'. Where the teacher might have said: "Man, mortal as to his body, is, as very man, immortal," he said "Man becomes immortal," because in him, 'being' is 'becoming'. Had he used the future tense (*bhavishyati*), we might have hesitated, and seen only a statement of future happening. But it is the present that is used, and for it our English translators should rightly have availed themselves of the more plastic English form and put: "The immortal *is becoming* immortal."

Here again I do not wish to stress unduly. There may have been a concession to tradition in the "become," as a state conditional on sacrifice performed. None the less am I convinced, that we have, in these great books, strata of teaching revealing at once

the prophet and the priest, distinct much as in Israel they were distinct, that is, as wording the new and as not wording it respectively. Word of prophet was suffered to survive (so far as it has survived), but the mantra of the priest survived also. And possibly the 'priest' who was not also a prophet, was content with the accepted 'magic' of 'coming-to-know,' and its sufficiency in the concept 'Thou art That'. Hence, it may be, is it why we get no 'Thou art becoming That'. And priest-, not prophet-born, may be, was the reaction against Becoming which we can see creeping up in the middle Upanishads, and then worded as a contention that had come and was now past.

Thus in the Maitri Upanishad we find a hedging on the idea of creation. The Creator here (a) "broods upon Himself," (b) "thinks: Let Me enter..." (c) "utters"... (here resembling the Hebrew idea). Yet the Way of Becoming lingers still strongly. *Bhava* is actually an *epithet of Deity*; and "God is to be praised in becoming," and again: "This One became threefold, eightfold, etc.". In the probably just earlier Śvetāśvatara, creation is not touched upon, but still the man, when he "sees the very Self, becomes unitary, end-won, griefless". In one line it departs from the earlier way of reckoning time in terms of becoming: "the has been, the is becoming, the will be(come)"; it terms the future "what the Vedas tell". But it may be that metre was here the rudder that guided

the ship.

It is when we turn to Ishā and Māṇḍūkya Upanishads, which are probably later than either of these two,* that we see as implicit, that this matter of 'being' versus 'becoming' had been a battle-cry in religious debate, 'becoming' being now termed *sambhūti*, a word not found before. Becoming is now reduced to mean, not exercise of an ever new Manifold in that which is, but as an originating from what was not. This is not the same thing and involves a complement of decay and ending: a limitation of 'becoming' to merely material things, to physical growth. It is true that in the Ishā text we find that man in becoming wins the Goal. But in the Māṇḍūkya the self-contradicting Ishā is purged at the fearful cost of 'becoming' in the very man being voted to be an illusion. And this conviction, that becoming must needs be followed by decay, is the weapon we find used, round about B.C. 230, by the newer as prevailing over the older teaching in Buddhism.

That the bogey of decay as involved in becoming somehow intruded was not without a cause; and I suggest it was from a double cause. I see in these middle Upanishads a new interest in the structure and functions of the body, which came to be so marked a feature in early Buddhism. We find this in the Kāṭha, Śvetāśvatara and Maitri Upanishads. And I seem to see herein a cultural

evolution which is the reverse to our own. With us it was physiology that stimulated, indeed almost gave birth to our new psychology. Our first psychologists were mainly doctors. But in India it may well have been the new interest in the processes of the mind, viewed as distinguishable from the self or man, started by one Kapila, which gave rise to analysis of body as important, not for physicians only, but also for religion. And this contemplation of bodily parts and processes would tend to preoccupy men with decay as inevitably supervening on growth or becoming.

In the second place, it may have been the very fertility in the idea of becoming that led to the same result. Indian teaching is steeped in parable and simile, and you cannot get far in the idea of becoming without hitching the notion to parallels in physical becoming or growth. We see this in the *bhū*-forms being equated by *vuddhi* in the Buddhist records, text and commentary, and in the constant use of 'fruit' for result or effect. And as the identity of Divine Spirit or Self with human spirit died out in Buddhism, the spiritual significance of man's 'becoming' would get worsened too, and the term inseparably bound up with the term 'decay'.

It was all perhaps the inevitable result of a mighty idea planning too high in the Unknown, lacking working contact with the facts of

life. "He who knows Brahman becomes as (or just) Brahman,*": here stood the teaching when the Sakyamuni began his mission. And for the earnest but critical hearer it may then have been felt baffling as it may now. "How," asks my friend, Edmond Holmes, in appreciating this great Indian idea "does he become It? Is the transformation immediate, or effected through a process? Does the knowledge as such transform one's being, or does it initiate a process which leads to a transformation, which in its turn reacts on this knowledge and makes it "real," instead of merely notional?" To subtle and searching questions like these the Sakyan Teacher was little called upon to devote his thought. His waiting world was less that of the intelligentsia than was that of the brahman teacher; it was mainly that of Everyman. And to that world his mandate was: "Seek after the Self!†" but not by the yea or nay, by the 'as if' or 'as if not' of dialectic in things we cannot yet understand. Live in the way you hold most worthy; so persisting you are already becoming a More toward That. Trace out the 'track,' the *mṛga*, *marga*, that is your Becoming-in-living. Ever thereby is the separation narrowing; ever thereby is the time when you will know the how, when, where, drawing nearer. In vital becoming lies your coming to know.

Thus it was in a world, where the idea of man's bridging the

gulf between Deity and man by the notion of a long Way of Becoming had been felt after, but was faltering, a world, that is, of the cultured few, that the Founder of what came to be known as Buddhism arose and brought out that message to the many. Among the many the idea of man as being able to become a wonderful More would be only just emerging, as fruit of much teaching to the few. But meanwhile a new way of bridging the wide gap had been springing up. This was what is understood under the term Yoga, as complement and opposite of Sāṅkhya, terms which may very roughly be defined as intellectual knowing and volitional effort; a specializing, so to speak, in the large early comprehensiveness of the words for mind: *manas*, *cetas*. We find them first emerging in the Śvetāśvatara Upanishad: "Him . . . attainable by Sāṅkhya-Yoga, by knowing the God." It was especially the latter method as an exercise, a willed process, "uniting, joining," which had, as its avowed object, a bringing the human self nearer to its divine ideal and counterpart: "my Kinsman, won to evenness and unity with Whom I become really he who I am." Literally a mechanical idea as compared with the essentially biological idea of Becoming, its stress for the Indian mind lay more in the effort, the toil, that being 'yoked' suggests, and the concentration therein, than any external bringing to-

*Maitri only (apparently) quotes Ishā in appendices.

*Muṇḍaka Up.

†Vinaya, Matravagga.

gether. And Yoga did good service in Indian religion.

We shall find it emerging in early Buddhism with a distinctive use it did not have in Brahman teaching. This is because the former teaching was, as the latter was not, in labour-pains over the fellowman. This must never be forgotten; it is a mighty complication in the religious problem. Man was giving birth to the vision of religion as meaning for each, not only the realizing of God more intensively, but also as bringing in a realizing more intensively who 'the other man' is. But just as in the Stoic and the Christian ideal, the ethical ideal was a corollary following from the idea of God, so should we be prepared to see, that the expanded values about the fellowman in early Indian Buddhism are a corollary following from the expanded teaching of Becoming which its birth signified. This I have dealt with elsewhere.

Here I have sought, I believe

in a new way, to show that the New Word, brought to his country by Gotama Sakyamuni, was not a reversal of that country's best religious teaching, but the effort to make it a living religion for every man and woman. It is for me a grievous error to make him out as essentially a Protestant, a Dissident, a Non-conformist, a man who was out to form a Set, a Party, a Cult, a Church. Protestant he was in this and that; all sound Catholics are that sort of Protestants. But that was in his pulling up weeds; his main work was in training a tender shoot of a wonderful plant so that following on the work of preparation done just before his time in India, it might 'become' what there was in it to become. To the extent that the very 'man' in Buddhism has been damned, his work has been frustrated. If and when, in Buddhism, the very 'man' will be revived, he will not for Buddhism have lived and taught in vain.

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS

"Considering now, brother Yamaka, that you fail to make out and establish the existence of the Saint in the present life, it is reasonable for you to say: Thus do I understand the doctrine taught by the Blessed One, that on the dissolution of the body the monk who has lost all depravity is annihilated, perishes, and does not exist after death?"

"Brother Sâriputta, it was because of my ignorance that I held this wicked heresy; but now that I have listened to the doctrinal instruction of the venerable Sâriputta, I have abandoned that wicked heresy and acquired the true doctrine."

—Samyutta-Nikaya (WARREN) p. 141

THE CHAOS OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY

[J. D. Beresford writes this Note and makes a most valuable suggestion: Who will write the book?—EDS.]

Psychology as we know it in the schools can be classified under three heads. The first of these includes all that classical psychology, which was treated in its relation to philosophy. The second which did not find a name until some thirty years ago, is still described as "the New Psychology," and represents the scientific attempt to analyse the personality in the laboratory or classroom by such criteria as reaction tests. Under the third head, we range all that material deriving originally from the work of Freud, however variously developed by Jung and Adler, to name only the two principal modern schools.

The first of these psychologies can be briefly dismissed. It was essentially *a priori* founded on premises that assumed man to be a fairly simple composite of soul and body. In its development it took such extreme forms as solipsism, the assertion that "all existence is experience and there is only one experient," or Kant's belief in the integrity of things in themselves, but its instruments were solely those of introspection and logic, and neither experiment nor, in the scientific sense, observation was considered as a necessary or even an available method for the philosopher.

The New Psychology represented the scientific reaction against all forms of *a priorism*. It deve-

loped as one consequence of the late nineteenth century revolution in favour of accumulating measurable and classifiable data by observation; and attempted in the first instance to get together a body of significant material. But failure to give any true account of the mainspring of action was implicit in the main assumptions. We might as well seek to account for the life and nature of a plant by observations of its growth in different surroundings or by experiments in the effects of light, humidity and soil. Nevertheless, the New Psychology did at least arrive at certain generalisations with regard to behaviour that are proving useful in connection with industrial conditions. This is certainly a very small contribution to knowledge, for a study that by definition deals with the soul; but it was undertaken in the first place long before the frank modern admission that science has no concern with a first cause, which is by hypothesis outside the reach of scientific methods.

The third type of psychology has no real relation to the other two. It arose almost exclusively from the work of one man, not as a philosophy nor as an academic investigation into the causes of human reactions, but as a clinical treatment in the cure of hysteria, depending primarily on the assumption of a kind of second self

within that commonly displayed, and labelled by Freud "the Unconscious". This designation, like most of Freud's, was an unfortunate one, but he was a doctor, not a philosopher, his terms were merely convenient symbols, and "psycho-analysis," the "unconscious" or the "endo-psychic censor" were never intended by him to convey more than does any other medical terminology.

Now there were two main reasons why psycho-analysis took such a strong hold on the public imagination. The first of these was this open postulation of the "unconscious" self. It was not new, Janet and the Salpêtrière school, for instance, had already done a lot of work on it in connection with hypnotism. But Freud's method lifted it out of the abnormal classification, and the general state of modern Western knowledge was ready to recognise the evident, *superficial* truth that we are constantly swayed by, and may in some cases be at the mercy of, inclinations and impulses, sometimes finding expression in action, which do not enter the awareness of the self commonly regarded as the representative personality. Also, in the same relation, psycho-analysis provided in some sort an explanation for the age-old mystery of dreams, some at least of which could be traceable, once the symbolism was recognised, to the partial liberation of thoughts on subjects that are repressed in waking life.

The second reason for the po-

pular interest in psycho-analysis was largely pragmatical and need not detain us here. The bare fact is that the method had a practical and useful application not only in the cure of hysteria, but in the recognition of psychological types and in the explanation of behaviour that from the point of view of orthodox psychology would be regarded as abnormal.

Beyond all this, however, psycho-analysis has an interest to the student of occultism in that it represents a real advance in psychological method. On the one hand, all the old premises have been not so much swept away as completely disregarded. On the other, although it may in one sense be described as scientific, and in the hands of some of its professors is fairly strictly confined to scientific method, its study outside the clinic may be conducted on the lines of philosophy, and pushed far beyond the limits laid down by practical experiment.

We might, for instance, begin an enquiry on these lines by postulating that most of the inferences of psycho-analysis and indeed of all the psychologies commonly so called, start from a false assumption with regard to the self. Working as they do from the outside inwards, modern psychologists have begun by presuming that the self is the personality recognised in ordinary consciousness as more or less truly representing the Ego; and have proceeded from that to diagnose the "unconscious" as a secondary personality, sometimes beneficent, sometimes inimical,

aiding or confuting this primary self. But it would be perhaps permissible in this connection, to assume that the unconscious, though it is not in itself the "ego," is the intermediary between that and the largely automatic creature that plays its part in the physical world.

To the scientist this suggestion would appear as wholly subversive of his method, which is and must always be strictly inductive. The philosopher would refuse it on the ground that it begs the essential question. But Science, as its exponents admit, is useless to us in this great investigation; and philosophy of the academic type continually turns in upon itself and is of value for the training of the mind rather than for any solution it can ever hope to give us to the riddle of Being. Wherefore, though we might later demonstrate the Truth of our assumption by recourse to acceptable evidence on the intellectual plane, we must in the first instance claim the inspired writings of certain Occultists as the authority for our premises, and boldly disavow that of Science, or the various psychologies that have hitherto been attempted.

By way of qualification, however, it must be admitted that to the older, philosophical psychologists this proposal of starting with the main assumption of an immortal influencing principle, would appear perfectly reasonable. A belief in the "soul" was implicit in practically all the older writings. But Freud's "unconscious" self

was known to them solely in its more perverse manifestations, and was doubtless often regarded as evidence of possession by an evil spirit. The psychologists had no need, therefore, to account for it as a necessary and exceedingly interesting element in the human economy, and by that omission lost one of the necessary keys to understanding and vitiated most of their conclusions.

I have been led to make this brief and insufficient analysis of the general study of psychology by reflection on the chaotic state in which that study exists to-day, and further upon the value that a truly enlightening psychology would have upon the general tendency of Western thought. At present there is no meeting ground for the deductive and inductive methods for those who posit the "soul" as the motive force of action and those who have failed to infer it by their study of human behaviour.

The former class fail deplorably to give any account of the phenomena whether abnormal or not, because their conception of the ego corresponds to no reality. Their idea of the "soul" in the majority of cases is a vague abstraction of what they regard as the moral quantities. It is postulated as being essentially good, and for them goodness consists in some kind of summation of Western ethics. In fact, this immortal principle of their theory is but a sublimation of the physical personality deprived of carnal lusts and appetites, a figure that

corresponds with the twin ideal of an anthropomorphic God. And nowhere does the conception touch or explain the valid deductions of modern psychology as to the functions of the "unconscious," being as remote from present day observations in this connection as medieval theory with regard to the stars is from the present findings of mathematical physics.

It would be impossible in such an article as this to indicate more than the broad lines on which such a psychology as that I am suggesting should proceed. The writer of it must be one who has a reasonably full acquaintance with the wisdom of the East, with Madame Blavatsky's writing on the subject and the position of the genuine Theosophical knowledge at the present time. But his immediate object in this connection would be not to proclaim that knowledge as inspired, but to make such use of it as would explain beyond confutation the phenomena recognised in psychotherapy or industrial psychology as sufficiently well demonstrated in common practice. The writer's aim in this part of the undertaking should be in effect so nearly scientific in principle as to carry conviction to the logical mind. He would provide the ideal theory that covers all the facts, with the fewest possible assumptions, and on that ground would compel the attention of a very great number of intelligent people who at present are either ignorant or contemptuous of Theosophical teaching in the respect. Beyond that

he would be unable to confirm and range the valuable material,—of which there is much, though the greater part of it was not fully realised by the authors themselves,—in the classical psychologies from Locke onwards, clarifying in the process their terminologies not less than their precepts.

Personally, I have a complete confidence that this book could be written and do all and far more than I have here suggested, by one who had the necessary equipment. In many small and comparatively unimportant ways I, myself, have tested the main principle, applying occult explanations to the phenomena recorded in works on modern psychology and realising that the problems involved tend to become simpler and more easily classifiable. One aspect of this application may be found in my two papers that appeared in THE ARYAN PATH last year on the subject of Automatism. My contentions as there set out do, in fact, reverse the order of importance commonly accepted by psychologists of the conscious and the "unconscious". For them the essential self is the known personality and the "unconscious" self, although many extraordinary powers are rightly attributed to it, is regarded as the automaton. Indeed all theories of suggestion and auto-suggestion rest ultimately upon this conception and it is for this reason that despite the occasional brilliant, and as some people regard them, miraculous successes of "faith" cures, the

principle fails to have effect in the great majority of cases.

Finally I wish to emphasise my belief that such a work as I have proposed would serve a very valuable purpose. There are, within my own experience, an immense number of intelligent people in Western Europe who recognise the significance of modern psychological knowledge and the strange if intermittent illumination that it throws on the mystery of Being; but who fail for various reasons to realise the true relation of this purely intellectual knowledge to themselves. For them the essential key to

self-understanding is still lacking because they never question nor find in their teachers, any authority for questioning, the validity of the superficial personality they build up throughout life. To such people the kind of work I have here suggested, would prove a great stimulus to set about the work of self-examination, and I believe that a proportion of them would thereby be set on the right way towards that increase of consciousness which the followers of psycho-analysis dimly apprehend as the goal of their ambition, but do nothing whatever to further by their practice.

J. D. BERESFORD

Between man and the animal . . . there is the impassable abyss of Mentality and Self-consciousness. What is human mind in its higher aspect, whence comes it, if it is not a portion of the essence—and, in some rare cases of incarnation, the *very essence*—of higher Being: one from a higher and divine plane? Can man—a god in the animal form—be the product of Material Nature by evolution alone, even as is the animal, which differs from man in external shape, but by no means in the materials of its physical fabric, and is informed by the same, though undeveloped, Monad—seeing that the intellectual potentialities of the two differ as the Sun does from the Glow-worm? And what is it that creates such difference, unless man is an animal *plus a living god* within his physical shell? Let us pause and ask ourselves seriously the question, regardless of the vagaries and sophisms of both the materialistic and the psychological modern sciences.

H. P. BLAVATSKY (*The Secret Doctrine* II, p. 81)

THE REIGN OF LAW

[Ivor B. Hart is the author of *Matters of Science, Mechanical Investigations of Leonardo da Vinci, The Great Engineers, The Great Physicists*, etc. He is an Honorary Research Assistant and University Extension Lecturer at the University of London.—EDS.]

There are certain terms in modern phraseology that carry with them a significance that strikes deeper into the human understanding than that of mere "importance". Concord and discord, for instance—and still more strikingly, order and chaos. There is an instructive sense of the tragic in the term "chaos"—a disruption on the grand scale—a tragedy of discord—sublime rupture of the forces of concord and order. Unqualified and complete chaos is beyond the human experience; but such faint approximations thereto as violent thunderstorms, and avalanches, and earthquakes can be terrifying enough. One emerges from such shattering experiences to the calm and the peace and the sunshine of a quiet summer's landscape with profound thankfulness of spirit.

In the human personality lies undoubtedly an instinctive craving for concord and order that finds its expression in "Law". H. P. Blavatsky (*The Secret Doctrine* I, 44) expresses it thus:

This desire for a sentient life shows itself in everything, from an atom to a sun, and is a reflection of the Divine Thought propelled into objective existence, into a law that the Universe should exist.

There is profound consolation in such a thought. It has, indeed,

the support of modern science. Even such a terrifying experience as an earthquake is known to be at the behest of law—a definite if abrupt and violent rectifying of the forces of strain to bring harmony and concord back from a temporary and local discordance. So birth, growth, decay, and change are all harnessed into a supreme unity. *The Secret Doctrine*, (I, 145):—

The Law for the birth, growth, and decay of everything in Kosmos, from the Sun to the glow-worm in the grass, is ONE. It is an everlasting work of perfection with every new appearance, but the Substance-Matter and Forces are all one and the same. But this LAW acts on every planet through minor and varying laws.

Esoteric Science has long taken a stand of sublime simplicity on this subject of Law to which it would appear that modern physical science is itself steadily, if slowly, tending in recent years. The difference of outlook has been that which may simply be expressed by the phrases, "Law," and "laws". Esoteric Science sees, ultimately, one Law; Western Science has been spending centuries in the elucidation or discovery of many laws. There is a vast significance in the difference between these two. Esoteric Science has ever been all-embracing—the sum of Existence and of the

Universe and all "that in it is," all come legitimately within the scope of its enquiry; whereas Western Science has been forced within material limits, so that even the "animate" studies of biology, of physiology, of anatomy and of psychology are approached fundamentally from the materialistic standpoint. We all know that stern, almost puritanical attitude of Western Science that seeks always to eliminate the "personal equation" by a refinement of methods of observation and of recording by the substitution of mechanical and electrical and self-recording devices for the hand and eye and ear of the human experimentalist.

We would ask the reader not to misunderstand our purpose. From the standpoint of Western Science this type of attitude is right and proper and logical. The personal factor is a disturbing influence and must be eliminated. Nevertheless it is inevitable that such an outlook is limited; and if this is so then, inevitably, too, the results must be limited. In Eastern Science the personal, equally with the impersonal, comes within the fold of human enquiry—and so the results are all-embracing. All belong, all are One, and therefore the conclusions are unifying. Western Science, on the other hand, with its self-imposed handicap of limitations, has accomplished a success that is partial only. This law, that law, and the other has successfully emerged from enquiry and experiment. Yet even so the trend of modern science is

gradually to indicate that behind these laws is an ultimate fundamental—a central Absolute and Universal Law to which, as a manifestation of its purpose and as the agency for the proper and the ordered functioning of the Universe, these more immediately evident and subsidiary laws are harnessed.

But for the proper comprehension of this there must be no limitations of enquiry. All phenomena, mechanical, organic, mental and otherwise, must be included—and if the enquiry be correspondingly more difficult, then at least the results promise to be more all-embracing. There is, of course, always the difficulty of the application of experimental methods to non-material data, to matters mental and spiritual. But experiment is not everything. There is also the vehicle of *analogy* as a mode of scientific enquiry. "Analogy" is regarded somewhat askance by the student of physical science. But inasmuch as inter-relationships repeat themselves in various forms and degrees in different aspects of the Universe and of the phenomena within it, not only is analogy admissible, but it is certain that, with proper handling, much more can be made of it as a vehicle of enquiry. The part this plays in esoteric science is much more fundamental. Thus we read (*The Secret Doctrine* I, p. 604):—

From *Gods* to *men*, from *Worlds* to atoms, from a star to a rush-light, from the Sun to the vital heat of the meanest organic being—the world of Form and Existence is an immense chain, whose

links are all connected. The law of Analogy is the first key to the world-problem, and these links have to be studied co-ordinately in their occult relations to each other.

Still more emphatically, in Vol. I, p. 150 of the same book, we read:—

In Occult Science this law [*i. e.* the Law of Analogy] is the first and most important key to Cosmic physics; but it has to be studied in its minutest details and, "to be turned seven times," before one comes to understand it. Occult philosophy is the only science that can teach it.

This is a strong claim, and as a mere student of modern science the writer is not prepared to

concede it in its entirety; but that analogy, properly understood and accurately applied (and in "Western" Science it is all too true that so far it is neither so understood nor so applied) there is potentially a powerful weapon for further enquiry seems to be also all too true. With its proper aid, that "one absolute, ever acting and never erring law, which proceeds on the same lines from one eternity (or Manvantara) to the other" (*Secret Doctrine*, II, 87), will yet emerge to the understanding and general comprehension of Man-kind.

IVOR B. HART

Analogy is the guiding law in Nature, the only true Ariadne's thread that can lead us, through the inextricable paths of her domain, toward her primal and final mysteries. Nature, as a creative potency, is infinite, and no generation of physical scientists can ever boast of having exhausted the list of her ways and methods, however uniform the laws upon which she proceeds. If we can conceive of a ball of Fire-mist becoming gradually—as it rolls through æons of times in the interstellar spaces—a planet, a self-luminous globe, to settle into a *man-bearing* world or Earth, thus having passed from a soft plastic body into a rock-bound globe; and if we see on it everything evolving from the non-nucleated jelly-speck that becomes the sarcode of the *moneron*, then passes from its *protistic* state into the form of an animal, to grow into a gigantic reptilian monster of the Mesozoic times; then dwindles again into the (comparatively) dwarfish crocodile, now confined solely to tropical regions, and the universally common lizard—how can man alone escape the general law?

H. P. BLAVATSKY, *The Secret Doctrine* II, pp. 153-4

GRACE BEFORE MEAT

[Lloyd Morris wrote a trenchant article in THE ARYAN PATH for September 1931, to awaken the East to a sense of Reality, to expose the pride of the West.

In this essay he broods over the kinship of all human beings, so peculiarly strengthened by the present economic civilization—one more appeal for the recognition of human interdependence. The *Bhagavad-Gita* (iii. 12-13) goes deeper in imparting the same instruction:

"He who enjoyeth what hath been given unto him by the gods, and offereth not a portion unto them, is even as a thief. But those who eat not but what is left of the offerings shall be purified of all their transgressions. Those who dress their meat but for themselves eat the bread of sin, being themselves sin incarnate."

And again, (ix. 27)

"Whatever thou doest, O son of Kunti, whatever thou eatest, whatever thou sacrificest, whatever thou givest, whatever mortification thou performest, commit each unto me—the Self of all creatures."

--Eds.]

Stooped beneath the sky, bowed above the earth; Man is linked to Man in common bond of jeopardy and toil. By hand and brain he has risen to some lordship over Matter; and in his triumph become braggart of a little thing. He has developed potencies that are evil, and used them; he has assembled things that are good, and misused them. He has tamed powers of earth and sky to his hand; and with human works fenced himself from crude forces unbridled to his mastery. Long domicile within this pale has made him scornful of that beyond his compass; and forgetful that in the atriums of Science and outside the confines of civilization, the Children of Men are still at elemental grips with the Universal Mother. In the bitter face of Nature's implacable cycles, he hardily denies that her enmity and her eminence yet exist;

but broken test tube and elusive formulae are emblem and eloquent to the quiet eye of research; and they who have their being and task on far reaching paths of wandering, also, look into the visage of Nature, and beneath the dignity of its design, discover the passive hostility of the immutable.

It is in the fashion of Man that he lives by diversities; and, so, the custom of urban life narrows our understanding with contrary effects. It introduces superior persons who affect a fine insolence of human works, and a marvellous regard for the natural. In the artificial they perceive all that is adverse of human weal; and adjure us to return, to nature, when all that is ill will be well. At fireside joustings, Bobadil in slippers contemns civilization from his safe security of its enjoyment. He protests that his health, his joyance, and all the

moral fibres of his being droop, from the pampered cosettings of organised society. He arches his chest and declares for the great open spaces and simple, kindly ways of Mother Nature. Beyond the horizon Nature waits on mischance; not to aid, but to destroy. The pure air of a wilderness will not set a broken limb, not tie a ruptured artery; nor bring food to dying lips; but, rather, the preying beast and devouring insect.

From the windowed vehicle of civilization we pleasantly regard the dissolving panorama; and in comely state thrill with vicarious alarms to spectacle of sterility and storm; but not till we have in fact or analytical comprehension passed from the sheltering complexities of our social structure to the elemental, can we rightly know Nature and fairly value gregarious effort.

Of the source of our social comforts and necessities we are indeed incurious; and render but little catechism concerning the quiet and securities which some profess to despise. Wherefrom, and how they come are questions that make no accompaniment to our careless enjoyment and flippant wastage of bounties brought for our provision, on wrung backs and at the weary hands of a multitude of men, women and children painfully abroad this precarious world. Do never the coals in the grate, or the taste on the palate convey anything other than satisfaction or surfeit? . . . no dark, heroic story of their winning? no overtones for our dulled ear of tales recited

in the privacy of labouring; hearts in crowded thoroughfare and wild waste?

The story of labour is a story that is epic and puts romance to shame; takes us into the stinking forecastles of leaky tramps lurching heavily over turbulent seas; sends us in the black and roaring nights of low latitudes, up the swaying mast, to clew frozen sails with numbed and torn fingers; consorts us with herdsmen in the chills and heat of remote frontiers; sets us hunger-bitten and thirst-tormented to carry a pack over burning leagues of plain, frozen waste, sterile hill and rock-tumbled valley; besets us on uncertain paths, with devouring perils, and no goodly fellowship for our journeying—only the blistering sun or gripping cold by day, and at night the elusive terrors of darkness, the imminent sky, and visions of sweet cities and thronging life of lamp-lit streets to visit an unquiet sleep; it ushers us into the still, close air of bacteriological laboratories; strangles sleep in the palaces of rulers of men and means; makes us inhabitants of sordid marts, with the whirring factory the tyrant of a grim world; and at last, by humble ways, and dangerous ways, and strange ways of wizardry, brings us to the shelter of our ameliorative households, with tap and switch convenient to our touch; fuel in our cellars, and genially tempered waters ready to run at a movement of our hand; the little shop just round the corner; public vehicles patrolling before

our door; and a subservient instrument by which without leaving our warm chamber and easeful couch, we can summon physicians to minister to our bodily ills, and porters to convey foodstuffs to our larder.

Every social benefit we have someone has toiled for. Someone has braved the inclement that we might live clemently; foregone that we may have; died that we might live. Somewhere on desolate seas, in far-off lands, and hither slum, struggle has been waged for the provision we enjoy with such little heed to the providers. Between primitive chance and the meanest citizen in the meanest of cities, are the far-flung units of civilization, wresting from the earth human necessities. In town and city are those who take the spoils of the pioneer, and from them weave, cast and fabricate necessities for all; luxuries for the affluent, and for themselves and for their fellows, each in their degree, comfort or means of a pinched existence hardly purchased with the wage of their hire. And if as we sat at meat, or with satisfied appetite lay securely in our chamber, we would over our feast and before the beating weather lulled us to slumber, briefly meditate our ease, then some melioration might accrue to the armies of industry, and enlarged enjoyment to all.

The social conscience tender under pricking does in its mood declare these toilers no blithe volunteers, but sullen conscripts

and complaining mercenaries. If in this we acknowledge a larger truth it is to denounce its greater crime as a product of an ill-regulated, ill-designed, and ill-directed economy that is at once our social detriment and our social shame. Freed-man or serf; conscript or hireling; at least we might fling them a generous word at no cost to ourselves; at least recognise that to promote their well-being is to further our own advantage; at least appreciate that if the social engine, constructively wrong and destructively functioning, has nevertheless produced the relatively complex wonder which is to-day's achievement, how greatly more comely a future waits on the human race, organised and directed in just and scientific co-operation. And should the burden and the beauty of a larger understanding come upon us, we shall look to issues beyond mere disciplined audits of sociological enhancements.

Man has accomplished little and failed in much: still is he slave to himself, and bondservant beneath the wide sky. His applauded achievements are mute of a greater wastage carelessly, indifferently, ignorantly squandered. For the foundations of our loftiest attainments are digged on dead men's bones unthriftyly spent; and puddled with tears of unnecessary misery. Let us then but once in the season of our life, briefly meditate but one story from the epic of Man, for our greater glory and our greater

shame. Let us but once take some occasion to consider how all we use of necessity or spend in superfluity, is won in the first resort by unremitting manual contest with raw nature; then in the drab, ugly factory; and ultimately by the high knowledge which compasses the more delicate and wonderful of our provisions, and is itself dependent for its exercise and advancement, solely on the labour of field workers delving, planting, and contending with black earth. . . . Black earth, bright sun, restless wind and flowing water: to such elements are reducible the magic of science, rare artistry, and the delicate of delicate refinements and common decencies of social life! Up the scale; down the scale; from black earth to black earth: the origin of our daily food, our daily toil, our daily pleasure, our daily toil; the genesis and common end of our material magnificence.

Artist and artizan; scientist and scrubwoman; magnate and scavenger; aristocrat and plebeian: all are subject to the ruths of nature and abide its ultimate stroke. All and each must fairly

labour, and fairly give of their bounty. Each to each is necessary, and none in their station more important than another; for none can tell when on them the burden of woe shall fall. And all our commonalty of toilfulness ends in comradeship of rest; but not alone from stricken fields of sanguinary glory is borne the happy warrior. In stifling tenement, sordid warehouse, tilled field, tyrannous kitchen, sleepless nursery, hushed sick-room, unobtrusive study, lowly office, and high seat of authority, sanctified achievement is made and done by joyous workers; whose unlauded heroisms are chronicled only in the untrumpeted tale of the Children of Men linked in happiness and sorrow on this rolling earth.

Therefore as we sit at meat, and before we take our rest, let the master of the house, the ruler of the feast, and everyone to his fellow recite from the tale of Man and say,—Let us now think with gratitude on those members of the great human family whose labours on land and on the sea have provided us with these enjoyments.

LLOYD MORRIS

ORPHEUS, A MAKER OF HISTORY

[C. R. King was the Editor of *Torch Bearer*, has published his translation from the original Sanskrit of *The Cloud Messenger* of Kalidasa, and is engaged in writing *Monotheism of Orpheus*.

Orpheus, says the Esoteric Science, is a generic name; hence the difficulty of assigning an exact date; we meet with the same difficulty in fixing any exact date for Zarathustra, for example. We draw attention to the Note which follows the article and which gives the views of the Esoteric Philosophy.—Eds.]

Orpheus, he that

With his lute made trees
And the mountain-tops that freeze,
Bow themselves when he did sing

is not supposed by the average educated person to be anything but a pretty myth, a pleasant figment of the Hellenic imagination. The late Miss Jane Harrison, in her *Prolegomena* to the study of Greek Religion, held that he was a historical character. The thesis of this essay is that he was no mere historical character, but in very truth a maker of history.

The well-known Orphic religion, which was dealt with in a review of Dr. Macchioro's "From Orpheus to Paul" in the February number of *THE ARYAN PATH*, was referred by the Greeks themselves to Orpheus as its founder, but because Orpheus was taken to be a myth this attribution has been in modern days generally disregarded. But it should be noticed that the bulk of the ancient references to Orpheus lay stress on his religious functions; and that when details of his magic singing are given, as for instance by Apollonius Rhodius, his theme is how the heavens came to be stretched out like a curtain, how the world began, and the stories of old reli-

gion. Antiquity never regarded Orpheus merely as a "sweet singer": like those of the "sweet singer of Israel" his songs were of religious import. It seems uncritical to put aside the whole mass of ancient evidence because of manifest extravagances. It is a total *non sequitur* to say, as modern scholars appear to do, that because stones have never been known to have been moved wholesale by music, and heads have never been known to go singing out to sea, therefore Orpheus never existed.

The case for the historicity, and the historical eminence, of Orpheus does not, however, rest on the mere general principle that where there is smoke there is fire, and that there must have been something in the multitudinous references to the religious work of Orpheus. There is a passage in the "Laws" of Plato (IV. 715D) which, though it has not received the attention it deserves, seems, if carefully considered, to be fairly decisive. Plato in this place speaks of

God, who, as the old tradition says, holding the beginning and the ending and the middle of all things fares by a straight path encompassing nature.

There is no reason at all to

doubt the statement of the scholiast that the allusion is to one of those Orphic hymns which Plato elsewhere in the same treatise mentions by name. Plato refers to Orphism fairly frequently, and this is not the only place where he speaks of it as "an old tradition". The scholiast cites two hexameter lines of the same purport as Plato's prose quotation, and lines practically the same as the scholiast's are found in Orphic fragments preserved by several writers.

Now the passage in the "Laws" is strong evidence of the existence of monotheism in Greece in an age which was antiquity to Plato. The reader may suggest that the passage smacks of pantheism, and this is readily admitted, for the Greeks drew no distinction between pantheism and monotheism; the Hermetic writers preach pantheism and then break out 'Holy is the Father,' and the same tendency is current in all the Orphic writings. But the point is that the passage is evidence of an ancient Orphic belief in One Immanent God.

Monotheism, or belief in One God even if that God is pantheistic, is not a belief of primitive man. Man at certain stages of development finds gods in stocks or stones or beasts: his religion is animistic or totemistic: he believes in 'spirits of the corn and wild'.

The doctrine of monotheism only comes as an effort of religious genius. The first monotheist known to history, that 'stupor mundi,' Ikhnaton possibly the

greatest hereditary monarch whereof the world holds record, who changed, for his own lifetime, a nation's religion almost in the twinkling of an eye, was undoubtedly of that calibre, and so were Moses and Zarathustra, each of them the first 'prophet of God' to his own countrymen. The 'old tradition' of Plato then is evidence of religious genius at the root of the Orphic faith 'in the dark backward and abyss of time'.

What further need have we of witnesses? Antiquity with one voice bears witness that the Orphic religion was due to one great man Orpheus. For those who see, the words of Plato are conclusive evidence of his existence and his greatness. There is no Lazarus who will rise from the dead to assure us that the plays of Shakespeare were written in very truth by Shakespeare of Stratford and by no Bacon or de Vere. There is none who can pledge us that Orpheus was the great man to whom the meteor moment of that ancient revelation came. The case is plain, and they who will not believe would not believe, doubtless, if one rose from the dead.

As down the night the splendour voyages
From some long-ruined and night-submerged star,

So, for men of understanding,
shines down the ages the light of
the long-observed genius of
Orpheus.

We have spoken of the "meteor moment" of that august forgotten revelation: there can be no doubt, surely, that it was in mys-

tical experience that the conviction of the Oneness of God came to Orpheus, as it came, in all human probability, to his great monotheistic predecessors in other countries whom we have mentioned, as well as to the unnamed Hindu genius or geniuses whose experiences underlie the mystical Upanishads. The Orphic cult was essentially mystical, a conscious striving for the union with the Divine; as the renowned gold tablets from Compagno, Petelia, Eleutherna, and elsewhere in S. Italy bear witness, seeing that it was only in the mystic ecstasy that the worshipper could come to realise himself, in the familiar and magnificent phrase of those tablets, as "a son of Earth and the starry heaven," and to expect for himself the promise,

O holy and blessed one, thou shalt
be a god instead of a mortal.

This striving after the Divine communion was of the essence of the cult and must clearly go back to the founder.

Orpheus in all the ancient accounts is a Thracian, and is connected in greater or less degree with the orgiastic worship of Dionysus which travelled at an early date from Asia to Greece Proper by way of Thrace. Doubtless he was brought up to the frenzied Dionysiac revellings of his native land.* His great soul, united in ecstasy with the wine-god Dionysus, found itself in the

grip of a power so strong that he could not but believe it to be the One Supreme Power of the World. Olympus or Pangaens was his Damascus-road, and on the Maenad-haunted mountains he saw the lucent Sabbath of the One.

This is the common form of the mystical experience. In white light ineffable dawns divinity on the soul, which feels that it has travelled beyond the heaven of heavens, beyond all being, in to the presence of Eternal Glory: it is bathed in an apocalyptic sea of bliss, and there is peace as on the morning of Eternity. It is by the unification of consciousness which it effects that this most marvellous of experiences begets belief in One God. In this experience, the soul becomes one with the divine; how, feels the developed soul, can the divine be other than one?

This was surely the experience of Orpheus, who is said, by several of the Christian fathers, from being a rank polytheist to have become a monotheist and a follower of the true way. And this account of his revelation squares very well with the version of his story given by Strabo:

Orpheus was of the tribe of the Cicones, and was a man of magical power both as regards music and divination. He went about practising orgiastic rites, and later, waxing self-confident, he obtained many followers and great influence. Some accepted

* Otfried Müller shows how much the Orphic Mysteries differed from the popular rites of Bacchus, although the *Orphikoi* are known to have followed the worship of Bacchus. The system of the purest morality and of a severe asceticism promulgated in the teachings of Orpheus, and so strictly adhered to by his votaries, are incompatible with the lasciviousness and gross immorality of the popular rites.—*Isis Unveiled* (II, 129)

him willingly; others suspecting that he meditated violence and conspiracy attacked and slew him.

It seems quite likely that, believing himself to have received a revelation, he should have waxed self-confident, and that his bearing as well as the revolutionary nature of his ideas should have aroused opposition leading to his death. Was not the Christ crucified for *his* self-confidence and that in a country less wild than the Thrace of Orpheus?

We have not, in an article of this nature, quoted all the evidence, but trust that enough has been said to show that there is very real ground for believing that Orpheus was a historical prophet who himself made history by being the first to preach to the Greek world that God is One. With the passage in the "Laws" before us, it may almost be said that if we had no other notice of the existence of Orpheus it would have been necessary to invent him: had all the rest of our literary records been consumed by the "vandal mice" and the Caliph

Omar that passage would still remain a rock of assurance.

The date of Orpheus cannot of course be fixed with absolute precision, but the following considerations are relevant. The first mention of the name Orpheus is probably that carved on the building at Delphi known as the treasury of the Sicyonians and assigned to the middle of the sixth century B. C.; about the same date he is referred to by the elegiac poet Ibycus as "famous Orpheus". In the popular mind Orpheus was often supposed to be anterior to Homer, but Herodotus is doubtless right in putting him later and in assigning 850 B. C., as the date of the epic poems he is doubtless right as to some part of them. We must allow at least a century for Orpheus to have become famous in Ibycus' time. Orpheus therefore may have lived at any time from 800 to 650 B. C. We shall probably not be far wrong in putting at about 700 B. C. the *floruit* of this great man Orpheus, the Thracian prophet of God.

C. R. KING

Orpheus (*Gr.*) *Lit.*, the "tawny one". Mythology makes him the son of Æager and the muse Calliope. Esoteric tradition identifies him with Arjuna, the son of Indra and disciple of Krishna. He went round the world teaching the nations wisdom and sciences, and establishing mysteries. The very story of his losing his Eurydice and finding her in the underworld or Hades, is another point of resemblance with the story of Arjuna, who goes to Pâtâla (*Hades* or hell, but in reality the *Antipodes* or America) and finds there and marries Ulupi, the daughter of the Nâga king. This is as suggestive as the fact that he was considered *dark* in complexion even by the Greeks, who were never very fair-skinned themselves.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY (*Glossary*)

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

PURPOSE IN PUBLIC POLICY*

[Professor C. Delisle Burns is well known for his numerous books on philosophy and economics. Not a mystic by temperament like the author whose book he reviews, he is an idealist whose opinions are always worth a reflection.—Eds.]

Even if I disagreed with the whole of Mr. Middleton Murry's new book, I should advise every one to read it. At least it is an attempt to consider fundamentals in "public affairs": and there are too many other books which are merely exercises in superficial agility. The fundamental issue is the purpose in public policy. Many people in all nations and in all social classes are discontented with things as they are. Some who have wealth or power or security think that they have not enough of such good things. Some feel offended if they see those who speak a different language either claiming or exerting a power they desire for themselves. Some who lack food or security of livelihood more justifiably desire to get food or security at all costs. But behind all these superficial disagreements is a disagreement about the kind of society which men desire to live in. This deeper disagreement as to the purpose of public action, for bringing into existence a desirable society, is not generally discussed.

Mr. Middleton Murry argues that "Communism," in his sense of the word, is a necessary out-

come of the policy of the Labour Movement in England; and that such an outcome is desirable. But first, without explaining the difference, he says that Russian Communism is not the Communism he means. He quotes Engels to show that Marx himself did not expect a violent revolution in England: the sentence runs *England is the only country where the inevitable revolution might be effected entirely by peaceful and legal means*. Mr. Murry is concerned to show that the narrower forms of what is called "materialism" are not Marxian: and that "revolution" is, in a sense, "spiritual". It is a change of attitude or point of view, and it demands a disinterestedness on the part of some of those who have something to lose, if the present system is to change. The call to self-abnegation is connected with the teaching of Jesus—the only Christian who has ever existed. And what is opposed is economic individualism—whether the individualism is of one person against another or of one nation against another. The whole work is addressed to those who have inherited or acquired what is best in English

* *The Necessity of Communism*. By J. Middleton Murry. (Jonathan Cape, London. 3s. 6d.)

civilization. The leaders of the Labour Movement in England are said to have accepted the "patriotic" assumptions of "bourgeois" mentality: and the sort of society which is desirable cannot be attained unless a "revolutionary" attitude is substituted for this.

The second part of Mr. Murry's argument contains several telling points against the policy of the British Labour Leaders in August 1931—both of those who accepted the bourgeois assumptions and of those who were driven to oppose such assumptions blindly because of an instinctive revolt of the rank and file. An English Communism, it is argued, must be a sort of religion: but it will not be what is preached by the Communist Party. Such Communism as Mr. Murry requires is an "ethical passion"—excited by the vision which Marx put before us. It implies an "economics of disinterestedness".

As an enthusiastic exhortation to reject the traditional assumption of British civilization to-day, Mr. Murry's book is valuable. No doubt men will not think of fundamentals, until they feel more deeply. Current economic theories are not based upon an adequate perception of the facts, because their exponents lack emotional vitality. But on the other hand, Mr. Murry nowhere gives a clear statement of what he means by Communism, as contrasted with what Russians mean or what the Communist Party means. He seems to believe that an emotion-

al repentance will project a programme for itself—which may be true; but what likelihood is there that such a programme would be good? Three pages are given at the very end, which are headed "the Practical Programme"; the essence of it is a minimum income, called by Mr. Murry a "wage," for every man, to be established immediately and to be paid out of the proceeds of the taxation of incomes, which are assumed to be already in existence, so that no incomes are left which are above £1,000 a year. Mr. Murry actually speaks of a "balancing of the budget by an increase of direct taxation". He has evidently not studied taxation. "Economics" he says "will adapt themselves to a moral decision:" and if he means that the results of his policy would be full of interest for students of the science of economics—that is true. It would be very interesting to see what would happen. But if he means that the amount of taxable income would remain the same whatever system of taxation was adopted, then he is mistaken. The difficulty of criticising such statements is that the critic may be accused of being a victim of "economic individualism". In any case, it is unfair to put too much emphasis upon the very sketchy financial policy of Mr. Murry's last chapter.

The defect of the whole book is that lack of precision which is most obvious in the last chapter. Many would agree that a com-

munity in which poverty and insecurity no longer existed should be the purpose of public policy: and that such a community *might* be established without violence. If that is British Communism, then there are some Communists in the Conservative Party. But the fundamental issue so stated is not sufficiently clear: and it does not become clearer as a result of exhortations to desire its establishment. To believe that it will become clearer by such means is the mistake of traditional Christianity. Unfortunately the hard labour of thinking on details of administration and production is required before we can make any step towards even "the kingdom of God". That hard labour was done by the Russian Communists. Of course, they had enthusiasm as well: and Mr. Murry may be right in supposing that no such enthusiasm exists on "the Left" in England.

He deserves thanks for his attempt to make those who accept privileges feel more deeply the incidental effect upon others of the privileges they enjoy. But another possible view is that the failure of "the Left" in England in August 1931 was due to an inability to think clearly. That inability was as obvious among those who accepted the statement of the issue by the financial groups as it was among those who refused to accept the consequences of believing such a statement. Perhaps in a few years we may see more clearly how completely those who derived political benefit from the "crisis" had swallowed an altogether ridiculous, but of course not necessarily dishonest, conception of the nature of the "crisis". In any case, words like "Communism" may be useful on platforms: but government cannot be carried on from platforms.

C. DELISLE BURNS

New Discoveries Relating to the Antiquity of Man. By Sir ARTHUR KEITH. With Frontispiece and Illustrations. (Williams & Norgate, Ltd., London. 21s.)

The prehistory of mankind may be compared to one of those pavements with which the wealthy Romans used to adorn their houses. Just as the weather and ploughing of the centuries have broken up most of the mosaic pictures, so that the only evidence left of them is an occasional tessera turned up in a furrowed field; so, on a vastly larger scale, has time obliterated the storied pattern—enormous in extent and intricacy—of humanity's past.

To collect the lost fragments of this mundane mosaic, and with them to reconstruct the original design, is the aim of the archaeologist and the anthropologist; but the "tesserae," for which they are searching, are scattered, not over a few ploughed acres, but about the whole surface of the planet: they take the form, *inter alia*, of implements of stone or metal, potsherds, skeletal remains, earthworks, and erections of stone or brick.

Although an enormous amount of material of this kind has been discovered, especially during the last few decades when it has been systematically looked for, yet it is highly impor-

tant to remember that, in proportion to what we have not, what we have is not much more than a negligible quantity. To attempt to reconstruct the past, prior to, say, B. C. 5,000 with the material at present in hand is rather like trying to divine the pattern of a Roman pavement, of which we have found only a handful of tesserae. And yet, so apt are we to theorise on inadequate data, that a vast amount of time and ingenuity is being devoted by leading anthropologists to the framing and refuting of one fanciful hypothesis after another. It is perhaps inevitable that this should be the case; and little harm can result if it be generally remembered that, in the circumstances, a hypothesis is but a guess writ large. If our information on a subject be complete, then only one explanation—the correct one—will account for it; but scanty data can be made to fit into the frame-work of any hypothesis that an ingenious mind can construct around them, much as an artist in mosaics could work our supposititious handful of tesserae into any design he happened to be engaged on.

The real business of anthropological science for some time to come will be the collection, recording and classification of information, while theorising on it should be regarded as merely tentative, and not to be taken too seriously.

In such circumstances it is clear that preconceptions are dangerous; and that the man who sets out with a theory, into the pattern of which he tries to force his facts, is likely to go far astray from the truth. He will be apt to look upon facts, not as clues to the discovery of truth, but rather as confirmations of his own personal point of view. Should a fact turn up that will not square with his beliefs, he will tend to overlook it, or to minimise its implications, or even altogether to discredit it. In a word, he will select, instead of collecting data; and his effects will tend, not to unveil, but to obscure truth.

Complete freedom from bias and a readiness to follow truth wherever she

may beckon us, are the rarest of the intellectual virtues. It seems to be almost impossible to avoid *liking* one view of things better than another, and thereby losing that clear and undistorted vision which alone can see through the appearances of things to the underlying verities.

Even so brilliant a scholar as Sir Arthur Keith, whose services to anthropology are very great indeed cannot be wholly acquitted of bias. He is a convinced and enthusiastic Darwinist; and the Darwinist theory is the canon by which he classifies and interprets his material. Both his *Antiquity of Man* and recent supplementary work have nailed to the mast, as it were, the Darwinist flag, in the form of frontispiece diagrams, in which the supposed common descent of men and monkeys is graphically depicted.

Since the original publication of *The Antiquity of Man* in 1915, Sir Arthur has convinced himself that evolutionary changes in the structure of the human body proceed more rapidly than he had formerly believed; and on this ground he now discredits the high antiquity of modern man, and sets aside all discoveries such as those at Galley Hill and Olmo, which he formerly held to prove the existence of *Homo sapiens* (Neanthropus) in Europe in the early pleistocene age. During the last weeks of 1931, however, new discoveries in East Africa have elicited from him an admission that he may be compelled again to change his opinion on this important subject.

Among the topics discussed at length in the present volume is that of the Taungs skull, unearthed in Rhodesia in 1924, and dubbed *Australopithecus* by its discoverer, Professor Dart, who was satisfied that "the being he had to do with must be given a place in or near the base of the human stem". In Sir Arthur's opinion, on the other hand,

a careful analysis of all the known features of the Taungs skull and brain has led many anatomists, including myself, to give *Australopithecus* quite a different place in the evolutionary tree. In all essential features *Austra-*

lopithecus is an anthropoid ape . . . of the same stock as the chimpanzee and gorilla. . . .

The extreme discrepancy in the interpretation of the Taungs discovery by the two professors is reminiscent of the controversy over the even more famous find made at Piltdown in Sussex in 1911, when the fragments of an ancient skull were reconstructed by Sir Arthur Smith-Woodward and Sir Arthur Keith respectively with utterly contradictory results. *Pithecanthropus* also, the "Java man," has been the subject of endless debate, and his precise status is still undetermined.

It must be remembered that several of the most famous discoveries, hailed by good Darwinists as authentic "missing links," have not been of whole skulls, the shape and characters of which were clear and undisputable, but of small and imperfect fragments, in the reconstruction and interpretation of which, as we have seen, experts have been unable to agree. Slender foundations then for dogmatic pronouncements as to man's ancestry!

In the Piltdown case, as in that of *Pithecanthropus*, the problem was complicated by the discovery, some little distance from the cranial fragments, of other bones which exhibited characteristics apparently at variance with them. Thus the Piltdown cranium, as reconstructed by Professor Keith, was quite human in character, but the mandible subsequently brought to light in the same locality closely resembled that of a chimpanzee. However, the two bones were eventually accepted by many leading anthropologists as belonging to the same creature; and in this way the Piltdown man, or rather woman, became a "missing link," with a human brain pan, and simian teeth and jaws. The cranium found by Dr. Dubois at Trinil in Java would probably have been attributed to an ape with little or no dispute had not a human thigh bone been found about twenty paces from it. Here, as at Piltdown, the two discordant fragments were forced into an unnatural

marriage; and the famous *Pithecanthropus* was the result. This "missing link" had an ape-like cranium, but walked upright like a man.

The skull, of which some fragments were unearthed by Mr. Turville-Petre in a cave near the Sea of Galilee in 1925, is generally considered to be a variant of the Neanderthal type, and seems to prove the wide distribution of that ancient race of men. In this skull the bone is much thinner than in nearly all other known Neanderthal skulls, while the forehead, instead of being low and retreating, is high and well arched. There is however no way of deciding whether it or they are the earliest in time.

For this reason the datable Neanderthal skull, which was found in the same year in a quarry at Ehringsdorf, near Weimar in Germany, is more significant than the Galilee find. Its decisive importance lies in the fact that it was discovered, not in a cave, but in a clearly stratified, and therefore datable, deposit in the open, which there is abundant evidence to prove is attributable to the genial period that preceded the latest (Wurm) glaciation. Inasmuch as all the known Neanderthal skulls belong to the succeeding cold period—dated by Sir Arthur as extending from 40,000 to 20,000 years ago—the Ehringsdorf relic is much older than any of them, and must be at least 40,000 years old. Instead, however, of exhibiting features even more simian and primitive than the later Neanderthal specimens, the bone of the Ehringsdorf skull is no thicker than that of most modern examples; the cranium moreover is surprisingly lofty: the forehead being even higher and more arched than in the Galilee skull. The cranial capacity of the Ehringsdorf skull is estimated at about 1480 cc. which is about the mean for a modern Englishman. Sir Arthur sums up in the following words:

As a rule we may regard skulls with thick bony walls and restricted brain space as being primitive in nature, and those with thin walls and expanded brain chambers as highly evolved.*

* It is the opinion of some distinguished anatomists that there is no evidence that the thickness of the skull bears any relation to the mental characters, setting aside pathological cases.—EDS.

When we apply this criterion to the Ehringsdorf skull, we see that it is less primitive than most Neanderthal skulls, and yet it is the oldest representative of the Neanderthal type known to us so far.

Commenting on the fact that the Ehringsdorf skull makes a nearer approach to that of modern man than do the later skulls of its type, Sir Arthur says:

As we trace the ancestry of neanthropic man and of Neanderthal man backwards, we ought to find, if the theory of evolution is true, that there is a growing degree of resemblance between them, for we cannot doubt that both have been evolved from a common stem.

This may be true, but surely if we ascend the stem, we ought, on Sir Arthur's own Darwinist theory, to find *Homo sapiens* and *Homo neanderthalensis*, while approximating to each other, also at the same time approximating to the anthropoid apes which branched off the hypothetical stem at an earlier period. The fact that Neanderthal man appears to get nearer the human norm as we trace him back through time, looks something like disproof of the Darwinist doctrine of man's descent. It suggests, furthermore, that the later Neanderthals were, not an evolving, but a degenerating race, and as such, doomed long ago to disappear as completely from the face of the earth as did the Tasmanians in our own time.

Sir Arthur's remark on the primitiveness of thick skulls with restricted brain space, suggests that such skulls would necessarily be stronger and more durable than those which were thin and lofty. Other things being equal, the cranial relics of a typical "low-brow" would long outlast those of a poet or an anthropologist! If a minority of the members of an ancient community were possessed of thick, receding skulls, may we not infer that, after the passage of tens of millennia, the surviving skulls would be in inverse proportion; that the type that was originally normal would now be exceptional—and *vice versa*? Like many other facts in anthropology, that of the usual thickness of ancient skulls is thus susceptible of more than one interpretation. It may quite well mean no more

than that such skulls have the best chance of survival. Bury a Newton in the same grave as the village idiot, and there will come a time when all traces of the philosopher's skull will have disappeared, while the thick-walled cranium of the idiot will have resisted the disintegrating forces, and remained to puzzle the savants of a future age, who might be tempted to build up on the strength of it a theory that the people of eighteenth century England were "primitive" and brutish. The Piltdown fragment, we are told, was so thick that the workmen who found it took it at first for a piece of coconut; but only an extremely thick bone could have withstood the weathering and gravel movements of a quarter of million years. How can such a fragment be taken as typical? It is at least as likely that the lady who owned it was a freak as that all her contemporaries were equally thick headed.

A parallel possibility of error exists in relation to ancient implements. We find iron tools in the most recent deposits, under them tools of bronze or copper, then of polished stone, then finely worked flint and bone, and much earlier still, big heavy flint *coups-de-poing*, or hand axes, which become rougher and cruder as we dig further into the past; and we assume a culture evolving from the battered Kentish eoliths, through many intermediate stages, down to the present elaboration of machinery. It is, however, perhaps more than a coincidence that the degree of durability of human implements follows precisely the same order as their assumed age. A *coup-de-poing* might be subjected to the wear and tear of whole geological epochs, and still retain traces of its human manufacture; while the more delicate tools made, if such were made, by the men who used the eoliths, would have been rotted or ground into dust ages ago. Can the fact then that the only surviving implements of the men of the early pleistocene or late pliocene are heavy, clumsy flints be taken to prove anything more than that, of all the products of their industry, only such almost indestructible flints

could in the circumstances have survived recognisable shape?

The story of the recent discovery of the remains of very ancient human beings at Chou Kou Tien in Northern China, as recounted by Sir Arthur, is one of the most thrilling of the many romances of anthropological research.

The excavations at Chou Kou Tien, undertaken by the Geological Society of China, have been proceeding for the last two or three years in charge of a young Chinese archaeologist, Mr. W. C. Pei, to whose skill and perspicuity their success appears to be due. Mr. Pei's first finds were a human tooth, a little later came the greater part of the right half of a jaw, then more teeth and pieces of a second jaw. When he received details of these, Sir Arthur concluded:

That in early pleistocene times a strange form of humanity existed in the Far East—already human in size of brain, but showing a strange mixture of characters, both old and new, in jaw and tooth. . . . Sinanthropus possessed characters which give him better claims than his contemporaries to be regarded as on, or nearly on, the evolutionary line which leads to modern races of mankind.

With most laudable honesty Sir Arthur has allowed this paragraph to go into his book unaltered, although it no longer expresses his opinion, his motive being, as he says, "that readers may see for themselves how far the methods of anatomists are fallible". What caused his change of view was the finding, in December, 1929, of the now famous "Peking skull," which on the preliminary reports and photographs, Sir Arthur pronounces to be of an exceedingly low type, similar to, though higher than, that of Pithecanthropus, and not to be regarded as in the line of descent of modern man. In 1930, fragments of a second skull came to light with thinner bones and somewhat larger cranial capacity than the first. Until these skulls have been submitted to the closest expert examination, we can only guess at their precise significance.

Up to the time that *New Discoveries Relating to the Antiquity of Man* went to press, no trace of the cultural activities

of Sinanthropus had been unearthed; and some men of science, including Sir Arthur Keith, seem to have inclined to the view that he was altogether toolless and fireless, and this, despite the insuperable difficulty of explaining how a creature without fangs and claws of nature's providing or weapons of his own manufacture, could have co-existed for millennia with such ferocious beasts as sabre-toothed tigers, bears, and wolves, whose remains are also found in the cave at Chou Kou Tien. This difficulty has, however, been cleared up by Mr. Pei's latest reports; for the tools and hearths of Sinanthropus have now been discovered, and his essential humanity thereby proved.

Prior to this latest discovery by Mr. Pei, there was no proof of the knowledge of fire making earlier than the Acheulean period in the chronological table adopted provisionally by Sir Arthur, from 40,000 to 80,000 years ago. But Sinanthropus was vastly older than this; and according to Professor Eliot Smith, his fires were lit hundreds of thousands, perhaps a million years back from the present time.

Until quite recently it was believed that the invention of pottery was made in the neolithic age, not earlier than about 8,000 B.C., but, as in the case of fire making, current opinions on this point have undergone a revolutionary change as the result of a discovery made by Mr. L. S. B. Leakey in East Africa. In his excavation of Gamble's Cave in Kenya Colony, Mr. Leakey uncovered four distinct layers with signs of human occupation. The top layer contained implements of the neolithic type; under it were two layers with palæolithic hearths and implements of the cultures known as Mousterian and Aurignacian when found in Europe; in the fourth and lowest layer of all, were fragments of pottery, the manufacture of which is thus demonstrated to have been carried on at a vastly earlier period than has hitherto been admitted by orthodox archaeologists.

R. A. V. M.

The Fountain. By CHARLES MORGAN. (Macmillan & Co. 7s. 6d.)
Brave New World. By ALDOUS HUXLEY. (Chatto and Windus. 7s. 6d.)

I

While contemporary fiction is concerned in the main with the problems and pruriencies of psycho-analysis or the apparently exclusive influence of environment and heredity on individual character, *The Fountain* strikes out boldly into the regions of the spiritual life. Therein its high distinction. It seeks to ascertain the conditions of a life worth living. How, it asks, can the spirit assert its supremacy over the turmoil of existence? To refuse even to put the question, to deny the spirit, to identify it with the appetites of the body and to merge it with the life of groups and institutions is the great modern heresy. Civilisation is breaking down under that error. It has "formed a habit of thinking in groups, classes, masses," but "masses are contrary to nature; they are not born, they do not die, they have no immortality . . . Every final reality of man's life is his alone, incommunicable . . ." It is with these incommunicable realities that *The Fountain* deals. Essentially, therefore, it is a religious novel, for religion, as Professor Whitehead has defined it, is what a man does with his own loneliness.

The ultimate goal of man, Mr. Morgan thinks, is a state of "invulnerability". The great saints and philosophers of history have all, in their several ways, struggled towards this ecstasy of self-knowledge. The desire for it is the only flawless and enduring desire of man. He "will snatch at the promise of even a ghost of that condition . . . He will lose the world for love because in his heart he wishes to lose the world, to shake it off . . . He sees all things moving about him; he sees all consciousness in flux; he desires, if it be but for an instant, to be as the gods are, to be invulnerable, to be still."

The story is of a young Englishman named Alison who finds his search for

the invulnerable continually interrupted—and illuminated—by the common incidents of life. He is interned during the war in Holland, near a castle, where he renews the acquaintance of Julie, an Englishwoman he had known in her girlhood. Her husband, von Narwitz, is an officer in the German ranks, and before he returns from the trenches, wounded and broken, the friendship between the two has matured into love, mutually recognised and consummated. But Narwitz feels neither anger nor hatred: his spirit is too strong and refined for that. He sees rather in Alison a kindred spirit, and conceives affection for him and confides to him his innermost thoughts. "Hatred and jealousy and possessive love," he says, in words which reveal at once the nobility of his resignation and the depth of his regard for Alison, "hatred and jealousy and possessive love, perhaps all earthly love, belong to the childhood of the soul, as you know. You are one of the few men living who understand that they are to be outgrown".

The Fountain maintains, that Life is not alien, inimical, to religion; it is not something to shrink from, or apprehend in isolated moments of heightened sensation; it is rather the setting, the field, in which the soul must conquer its peace. If it be objected that the rush and tumble of life must be fatal to any attempt at inward stillness, the answer is that the stillness would not be worth seeking if there already prevailed in the outer world the quietude and hushed immobility of death. "The supreme stillness is achieved in the open. We suffer and enjoy; we fight and love, win and lose; but in the midst of it all, are still." And when Narwitz inquires how the paradox can be made comprehensible, Alison replies, "I can think of a childish parallel with it that everyone will understand. When we play a game, we love to win and hate to lose; we don't stand aside in cold indifference but struggle passionately with every energy of body and mind; yet the struggle is unreal; another and deeper life continues in-

dependently of the game, and survives it, and is not affected by it".

A Hindu reader cannot fail to be struck by the resemblance of these ideas to the religious philosophy of India. The "invulnerability" of which Mr. Morgan writes is but the expression, in modern literary idiom, of the ideal of impassibility, of central poise and balance, set forth in the *Bhagavad-Gita*. (II. 14-15)

मात्रास्पर्शस्तु कौतेय शीतोष्णसुखदुःखदाः ।

आगमापायिनोऽनित्यास्तांस्तितिक्षस्व भारत ॥१४॥

यं हि न व्यथयत्येते पुरुषं पुरुषर्षभ ।

समदुःखसुखं धीरं सोऽमृतत्वाय कल्पते ॥ १५ ॥

The senses, moving toward their appropriate objects, are producers of heat and cold, pleasure and pain, which come and go and are brief and changeable; these do thou endure, O son of Bharata! For the wise man, whom these disturb not and to whom pain and pleasure are the same, is fitted for immortality.

The immortality which, in these verses, Shri Krishna offers to whoever can regard pain and pleasure, and all the "contacts of matter" with equal detachment, is precisely that inner ecstasy, unaffected by the tide of fortune, which Mr. Morgan considers to be the spiritual ideal. Even the metaphor of a game which he uses to explain the intermingling of the spiritual and the ordinary life, and the relative unreality of the latter, has nothing characteristically English in it, and is well known to all who have been brought up in the Hindu, and particularly the Vaishnava, tradition. The idea of *Krishna-Līlā* expresses just such a relation between the material and the spiritual as Mr. Morgan conceives. And his presentation of the external world as a veil behind which the spirit maintains its incorruptible existence, is it not at bottom the familiar doctrine of *Maya*?

That such ideas should form the substance of the work of an author hailed as being "absolutely of the new time" is surely not without significance.

II

There is one point at which the criticism implicit in *Brave New World* agrees with *The Fountain*—in condem-

ning the subserviency to mass opinions and standards which has become such a prominent feature of Western civilisation. But the truth on which Mr. Huxley lays stress is that man is bound to repugn, in the long run, all the pleasure and comfort in the world if he is denied withal the freedom to face his spiritual destiny squarely. "I don't want comfort. I want God, I want poetry, I want real danger, I want freedom, I want goodness, I want sin,"—cries the Savage in *Brave New World*, and the sentence in many respects sums up the whole book.

Yet Mr. Huxley does not see that the revolt against pleasure is itself a phase to be outgrown and without absolute value. Even pain cannot be the halting place of the spirit. The phrase, "the right to be unhappy," would, I think, scarcely occur to the author of *The Fountain*. Its appeal to Mr. Huxley lies in the fact not only that it is clever and paradoxical, but that it expresses perfectly his central conviction of the triviality of what passes for happiness. Disgust of human occupations, especially such as men take delight in, is with him the strongest emotion. It is a kind of disgust he has himself criticised in Swift: only with him it is purely intellectual, whereas in the case of Swift, it was based on a vital and, in comparison, an almost sympathetic comprehension of human error and frailty.

The "brave new world" Mr. Huxley satirises is a pseudo-scientific utopia resting on the twin pillars of Eugenics and Behaviourism. Happiness and Social Solidarity are its watch-words. Its population is bred in laboratories, and are so "conditioned" that when they have performed, robot-like, each his appointed—and congenial—task, he is content to divert himself by fornication or drug himself with *soma*, knowing that in neither case would there be any after-effects to cause remorse. A paradise truly earthly!

And yet one flies from it in horror because its principle is to suffocate the soul under the weight of physical plea-

sure, and to subdue it to a mechanical social routine. Even desire is deprived of its creative force; for it is foreseen from the cradle, nay, from the test-tube, and released, restrained and indulged by the external agencies of science and economics. Everything, indeed, is accomplished by external agency: every comfort, every need, every distraction, every longing, is supplied by the elaborately organised institutional system. Nothing costs much in individual exertion. The only, the ubiquitous agent is the Community; it is God, and a kindly God; it keeps the individual in a state of uninterrupted sensual satisfaction—asking from in return no more than that he shall submit to his good fortune, and enjoy himself absorbedly. He may not turn aside, and look within, or beyond, at the stars. To do so is the cardinal sin—to have an inner life, to harbour a private thought, to form a personal attachment. These things generate feeling: they foster individuality: they break the uniformity of the social surface. Hence they are taboo; and taboo also are Art

and Religion; and Science even: for all three spring from the same seed: the aspiring, indomitable, tortured and restless spirit of man. To exclude *that* is essential if life is to be an unbroken round of pleasure.

Mr. Huxley paints this nightmare world in violent and corrosive colours. Its hideous materialism fills us with revulsion. But that is all. The satire wastes itself in mockery. That is Mr. Huxley's characteristic weakness: for though he can deride brilliantly and destroy effectively, constructive he is only in art, not in philosophy. His intellect can embrace no fruitful positive conception. That is why *Brave New World* lacks the solidity and sustained fervour of *The Fountain*. Mr. Morgan has raised himself to the height of a spiritual tradition, the tradition which declares that "here, where men sit and hear each other groan," the soul can attain to an immortal bliss; but Mr. Huxley stands alone, perplexed and scornful, able to see nothing in any desire or ideal or instinct of man that is not absurd and contemptible.

K. S. SHELVANKAR

Jewish Mysticism. By Dr. MARTIN BUBER. Translated by LUCY COHEN. (J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., London. 6s.)

A Simple Method of Raising the Soul to Contemplation. By FRANCOIS MALAVAL. Translated by LUCY MENZIES. (J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., London. 7s. 6d.)

Though the possession of anything approaching the nature of a mystical element is commonly denied to the religion of the Jew,—for, the Pauline antithesis of law and faith has stamped it as a religion of legalism,—yet Judaism did give prominence to something more than historicity and tradition or formalism. In fact, in order to save itself from being barren and lifeless, it had to lay stress on the element of personal inward experience. Naturally therefore Jewish mysticism, like other varieties of mysticism, springs from the religious desire of the mystic for an intimate communion with the Deity.

And the two outstanding schools of Jewish mystical thought, the Talmudic Midrashic and the Jewish-Hellenistic, cluster around the visionary experiences of the prophets of the Old Testament. But in the Middle Ages, the Zohar became the chief of all the Jewish mystical text-books; and on the subsequent Jewish mysticism its influence was, indeed, inestimable. As a matter of fact, it even inspired Chassidism, the strange form which the powerful Jewish revivalist movement assumed in the eighteenth century in Poland. And it is this Jewish sect, which came into existence as a reaction against the orthodox Judaism of that period, that forms the subject of Dr. Buber's study in the present volume under review.

Being a protestant movement, Chassidism naturally upholds new ideas and novel conceptions from those generally attributed to Judaism. While the founder of the Chassids is Baalshem, the source

of Chassidism is the oral teaching handed down from generation to generation of Jews. Prof. Buber lived among this sect of Jews for some years, and his book, *Jewish Mysticism*, describes their religion, explains their strange beliefs, and narrates their stories and legends in simple style just as the author collected them from the lips of those unlettered people. The distinctive ideas of the sect, such as Deliverance, the Immanence of God, the "return" of the soul, are all clearly put forth, and other interesting tenets are carefully recorded. Though Chassidism appears to us as a movement of the past, the author assures us that its regenerative ideas are still powerful. "In truth," says he, "nowhere has the spiritual power of Judaism made itself felt in the last centuries as among the Chassids. The old power lives in it which once bound the Eternal to earth, so that it might be realized in daily life, and thus, without changing an iota of the old Law, the ritual, or the tradition of daily life, what had become old can live again in a new light and expression." Even to-day the mystical spirit is alive in many a Jewish poet and theologian; but the mystical life is absent because of the unfavourable conditions of modern life to the cultivation of quietude and introspection. Nevertheless, this book will certainly be of as much value to those interested in the adventures of the human spirit in the realm of religion, as to those concerned with this unfamiliar aspect of Judaism.

Wherever man's attention is powerfully focused on religion and the relation of the soul to the Unseen, there mysticism appears under various aspects among all races. The seventeenth century France was distinguished by a sudden outbreak of mysticism as a protest against the representation of the divine and its relation to man and the world in a mechanical or anthropomorphic fashion. Francois Malaval's book, *A Simple Method of Raising the Soul to Contemplation*, gives us an insight into the second phase of that great outburst of mystical religion in France.

The keen realization of the metaphysical unity of existence, and, in particular of the intimacy of the relation between the finite and the infinite, is what gives mysticism such element of truth as one finds in it. Driven by the thought of ultimate unity of all existence, and impatient of even a seeming separation from the creative source of things, mysticism succumbs to a form of passive contemplation in which the distinction of individuality disappears, and the finite achieves, as it were, perfect union or identity with the Being of beings.

In his book, Malaval treats of two distinct kinds of contemplation: acquired and infused; natural and supernatural. There are, according to our author, five common obstacles to meditation: illness, depression, lack of preparation, wandering attention and laziness. In the First Treatise of his book, Malaval, like other mystics, teaches a very simple, realistic and supple prayer, maintaining that genuine contemplative prayer, though it begins as a gentle effort of the soul, aided by the grace of God, develops in course of time "a habit of holding one's self in His presence, with more or less facility, according to the condition of advancement of each soul". Our "blind saint of Marseille" does not profess to traverse, within the short space of his book, the vast territory of spiritual experience, or to formulate a practice suited to all souls. In fact, he leaves untouched some vital aspects of the life of prayer and ways of union with Deity.

Though the author asserts,—and that rightly,—that his own path is open in its simplicity to many who have not tried it, yet he, being keenly alive to the requirements of different spirits, sincerely strives to safeguard the legitimate liberty of each. Consequently, his volume is not an exhaustive treatise on the interior life but only a practical guidance to contemplative prayer. His style being surprisingly simple and his presentation strikingly homely, there is some danger of the reader losing sight of the lofty character of Malaval's teaching unless

the book is read with great humility of mind. Further, it must be pointed out that the author, as a Catholic, naturally assumes the normal Christian background of spiritual discipline, and founds his doctrine solidly on the great Catholic tradition of contemplative prayer. These remarks apart, we must say that the efforts to bring out the first

English translation of this exceedingly rare treatise on mystical prayer have succeeded not only in contributing a valuable addition to the literature of the interior life but also in making available to modern readers a lost French masterpiece of the seventeenth century spirituality.

JAGADISAN M. KUMARAPPA

Fundamentals of the Esoteric Philosophy. By G. DE PURUCKER, M.A., D. Litt. Edited by A. TREVOR BARKER. (Rider & Co., London.)

This book comprises a series of 48 lectures delivered by Dr. de Purucker in 1924-27. It takes the form of a running commentary on H. P. Blavatsky's *Secret Doctrine*, a paragraph from which serves as the text for each lecture. The author is a learned and scholarly man, who has clearly devoted much time to studying the classics of Theosophy. Much that he has to say is suggestive and interesting; but, on the other hand, many of his interpretations are very much too speculative. His commentaries on the esoteric teachings sometimes may make them easier to understand, but at least as often render them more complex and less intelligible. Dr. de Purucker as a rule touches but lightly on the more concrete matters dealt with in the *Secret Doctrine*. He has but little to say about the historical, psychological, and astro-physical aspects of Occultism; but delights to expatiate on its most abstract and metaphysical side, in which it is almost impossible for the ordinary reader to assess the value of his utterances. Inasmuch as many of the statements about such transcendental topics in a work like the *Secret Doctrine* are rather to be taken as hints to the intuition than as definitions addressed to the reasoning faculty, no amount of talk, however learned, can possibly make them clear to those whose intuition has not been to some extent awakened. And so it is inevitable that, in his attempts to explain the unexplainable in words, Dr. de Purucker sometimes

leaves us with a sense of bewilderment. Where Blavatsky was cryptic, he is merely abstruse.

Dr. de Purucker makes no distinction between the statements of H. P. Blavatsky and his own glosses and comments, but all are woven together into a continuous narrative as the *Esoteric Philosophy*. He is evidently convinced that he is qualified to speak with authority on occult subjects, and we are to understand that, when he supplements the Blavatsky teachings, the original and the added matter are to carry equal weight. This feature of the book must very largely spoil its usefulness for all who do not share the opinion as to the author's occult status which is current in the Theosophical Society of which he is leader.

Very high claims were made for the book in the preliminary announcements, which promised that it would disclose truths known only "to a few elect since the closing of the Mystery-Schools of Ancient Greece" by Justinian. We were told, moreover, that the volume would give out certain "esoteric keys" not contained in the *Secret Doctrine*. One at least of these "keys," namely the importance of the Decad in occultism, seems to have come from H. P. Blavatsky's *Esoteric Instructions*; another is the doctrine of Hierarchies, Dr. de Purucker's statement of which is strikingly divergent from that in the *Secret Doctrine*.

As an illustration of Dr. de Purucker's tendency to seek to extract the inmost meaning of occult teachings by extending them on the same plane—by expanding them horizontally instead of

probing them to their depths vertically, we quote the following from p. 217:

... the 'One', merely calling it the 'One', because it is the Summit or SELF of that Most Great Hierarchy which our imaginations can attain to. But beyond its boundaries there are innumerable other such Ones: and beyond all such Ones, there are innumerable hosts of indefinitely greater ONES: and so *ad infinitum*!

Dr. de Purucker gives a clue to his method when he says, on p. 144: "What endless realms for speculation open for

us here". He should have remembered the warning words of the great Zen Patriarch, Wei Lang, who said:

The reason why Cravakas, Pratyeka Buddhas, and Bodhisattvas cannot comprehend the Buddha-knowledge is because they speculate on it. They may combine their efforts to speculate; but the more they speculate, the farther they are away from the truth.

To which the Chinese translator adds the following note:

Buddha-knowledge is to be realised; it cannot be known by speculation.

R. A. V. M.

The Book of the Gradual Sayings, (Anguttara Nikaya). Vol. 1 (Ones, twos and threes). Translated by F. L. WOODWARD, M.A., with an Introduction by Mrs. RHYS DAVIDS. Published for the Pali Text Society. (The Oxford University Press, London. 10s.)

This is a new translation of the first three of the eleven classified groups (Nipatas) of the recorded sayings of the Buddha, which Mrs. Rhys Davids, in an admirable Introduction, describes as "headings for discourse" rather than material to be read in book form. In the first three groups the subject deals with single things, then double things, (such as the "Two ways to Happiness" or the "Two Types of Companion"), then triple things (such as the "Three Occasions on which Energy is to be exerted," or the "Three Forms of Pride that must be destroyed"), and when it is realised that the Buddha's discourses were delivered to a bookless world one can understand the reason for the "arithmetical" method employed.

Some years ago the whole Scripture was translated into German by the Bhikkhū Nyanatiloke, and the first four Nipatas have at different times been translated into English by distinguished scholars in Ceylon, but that is all, and we are therefore as grateful to Mr. Woodward for his undertaking a new and complete translation into English as for the extremely able and intelligent way in which he has begun to carry it out. In her Introduction, Mrs. Rhys Davids praises the translator's choice of

renderings of certain Pali words, in particular congratulating Mr. Woodward on leaving the untranslatable term 'Dhamma' in its Pali form. So far we agree, but when she goes on to adopt his rendering of *jnana* as 'musing,' instead of the usual 'trance,' we can agree no longer. If it be argued that there is no better English equivalent we answer that we fail to see the necessity for translating such a term at all. English is not a philosophical language and there is no equivalent to certain Eastern terms. If Nirvana, Kamma, and Deva can be left in the original, why not Jnana and Bhikkhu, for which latter term 'monk' is *not* an English equivalent?

All this, however, is a matter of terminology. Of far more importance is the position of the Scripture in the Pali Canon and its insistence on the dual nature of the self, as shown, for example, in Chapter 4 of the Book of the Threes where the Buddha speaks in terminology which can only be translated, "Self which has dominion over the self," and this duality, as Mrs. Rhys Davids once more emphasises, "the Self with the self, is a music of the old, the original Sakya, which may be said to be almost lost save in the Dhammapada and the Anguttara". Those who have studied her recent works will understand what she means when she exhorts the readers of this translation to listen "with Sakyan not with Buddhist ears," her thesis being that the Buddhism of Ceylon to-day is for the most part Bhikkhu-made, and

is at times a sorry parody of the dynamic splendour of the Master's actual words. Herein lies the lesson of this Scripture to those who would confine the Buddha's teaching within the four walls of a dogmatic creed. Not until the wrongful accretion of the centuries is cleared away from the Pali Canon will the vital message of the greatest of the sons of men be known again in the world of Pali Buddhism; for here was no nihilistic pessimism, as the West would fain believe, but the immemorial message of Theosophy couched in Pali terms.

Commenting upon Mr. Woodward's interpretation of certain of the "key words" in the Scripture, this tireless pioneer, who with her late husband has done so much to bring the message of the Enlightened One to Europe, remarks: "It is to these three central words—*Atta*, the man, the self, as both divine and human, *Dhamma* the divine self admonishing, guiding, and *Bhava*, the way of the human self expanding to the divine self—that we need to pay utmost heed in reading these Sayings."

CHRISTMAS HUMPHREYS

Mystery of Life. By PROFESSOR JOHN BUTLER BURKE, M.A. (Elkin Mathews & Marrot, London. 3s. 6d.)

The Yogi sees Brahman in himself and therefore in the world. But his spiritual experience, according to the Upanishads, is beyond all speech (*Taittiriya* II, 9). This highest spiritual experience is not confined to any particular creed. But, as Professor Burke rightly complains "the majority of scientists have no such experiences and would be inclined to dismiss the testimony of others in this regard either as hallucinations or perhaps sane delusions". "It is difficult to apprehend" says the author further, "why the experience of religious sense should be questioned more than that of the *Æsthetic* or the *Ethical*." The ancient Indian thinkers did regard the knowledge and attainment of the Supreme Self—as the science of all sciences or as the only real science (*Mundaka* I, 1).

But as the author says, scientists confine their inquiry to objective truth only. Spiritual experience being subjective does not admit of experimental tests. It cannot be the basis of any truth in the "scientific" sense. There is thus a fundamental severance between science and philosophy.

The limits of scientific inquiry are somewhat extended by recent developments in higher physics and mathematics.

Even with the aid of the new theories a rational proof of the transcendental ideas

is not possible. The author is conscious of this limitation and has taken up the less ambitious but safer way of illustrating and explaining these ideas as highly reasonable probabilities, by the aid of advanced mathematics. His theory of life is based on "an extension of Leibnitz's monadology to the Platonic theory of Ideas on the one hand and to the modern ideas of Relativity on the other". The mathematical explanation of this theory of life is too complex and subtle to be "popularly" explained. Professor Burke has however endeavoured to make the book as little technical as it could be. The treatment of the subject is not merely academic. The earnestness of the author is apparent throughout the book.

Atman, according to Indian Philosophy, is beyond the considerations of time and space (दिक्कालबन्धनवच्छिन्न). By the aid of advanced mathematics the author has shown how the existence of the Monad beyond time and space is conceivable scientifically. "The truth is one, though sages describe it in different ways" says the *Rgveda* (I-164-46). The Mathematical philosophy so assiduously developed by Professor Burke can be ranked with these different ways. We join the author in his hope that his method will "smoothen the way towards a reconciliation of the apparent contradictions between mystic or religious and scientific truth".

G. V. K.

CORRESPONDENCE

PRACTICAL INTERNATIONALISM

A profound thinker who at the age of thirty abandons a career to go to minister to the sick negroes of a foreign colony must, alone with his practical work, be pre-occupied with the questions involved in colonisation and the establishments of right relations between men of different races.

Dr. Schweitzer's Hospital is situated in one of the least developed colonies of Africa, whose inhabitants are for the most part among the most primitive still to be found on the Continent. The Doctor is, then, confronted with the very elements of the problem. How does it present itself to him? How does he suggest it should be met?

The independence, he says, of primitive peoples is lost from the moment the first ship touches their shores to barter for native produce—rum or salt, guns and powder or other manufactured articles. The former social, economic and political conditions are from that day in danger, and are overthrown unless governments step in to protect such peoples from the ravages of trade.* Next there arise two questions. Are we simply the masters of these races, justified in regarding them merely as raw materials for our industries? Or are we responsible for the spread of a new social order, for aiding them to a higher development? It is hardly necessary to say that Dr. Schweitzer admits no right to colonize unless the second question is answered by an emphatic affirmative.

The fundamental rights of man which the colonising power must ever strive to preserve are as follows:—

- (1) The right to a dwelling.
- (2) The right to free choice of residence.
- (3) The right to the land and unhindered enjoyment of its produce.
- (4) The right to free choice of work and free trade in commodities.
- (5) The right to the protection of the law.

- (6) The right to live as a natural political group.
- (7) The right to education.

Few would dispute these rights in theory, but in practice all are actually menaced by contact with Western civilisation, as Dr. Schweitzer points out in detail. Take, for instance, the right to free choice of work. If there is famine in a certain district, and the men of another, where plenty is enjoyed, refuse to transport food (of course in return for proper payment) to the sufferers, the State must compel them to undertake the work of relief. Again, the employment of porters on the trade routes has throughout African history been a devastating necessity. The State is therefore justified in moving this secular evil by compelling men, in return always for due remuneration, and with every possible precaution, for their well-being, to build roads and railways. These undertakings may for the time being be a far greater evil than portage, but once they are completed will have the effect of promoting the general prosperity and of saving countless lives.

So far as concerns the securing of legal justice it is noteworthy that Dr. Schweitzer considers the greater cases of injustice such as reach the press may be of less import than the innumerable little cases of oppression and injustice which result from the sending among the villagers of young inexperienced men without sufficient moral weight for posts which require knowledge, tact and broad sympathies. In fact, in every direction it is the individual white man whose influence is decisive. Primitive men, accustomed to patriarchal authority have no understanding for an impersonal "department," and the ultimate success of colonial government rests with the high sense of duty, the understanding humanity, and the idealism of the individuals by whom it is represented.

* What trade with negro tribes meant a hundred years ago is well exemplified in Theodore Caust's *Memoirs of a Slave Trader*.

The sixth right of the primitive man Dr. Schweitzer regards as bound up with the question of the seventh, and as regards education he emphasises strongly the point that it must not only be a training of the brain-power of the native, but of hand and eye and brain simultaneously.* No social order can be built up unless the tribesman is able to construct his own house and grow his own food. The teaching of industries must go hand in hand with the teaching of the three "R"s, or the primitive race will only be transformed into an incoherent society of clerks and the like, economically dependent and unable to evolve a higher civilisation. It is lamentable too that native industries so often go backwards instead of forwards "just when the rise of a solid industrial class would be the first and surest step towards civilisation". To teach the dignity of labour at his Hospital the Doctor often wields a spade or a hammer and gives an example to all, black and white alike, in undertaking with his own hands the humblest and most tedious tasks.

But with the best will to preserve the rights of man, a colonising government is faced in the nature of things with insuperable difficulties.

The tragic element in this question is that the interests of civilisation and of colonisation do not coincide, but are largely antagonistic to each other. The former would be promoted best by the natives being left in their villages and there trained to various industries, to lay out plantations, to grow a little coffee or cocoa for themselves or even for sale, to build themselves houses of timber or brick instead of huts of bamboo, and so to live a steady and worthy life. Colonisation, however, demands that as much of the population as possible shall be made available in every possible way for utilising to the utmost the natural wealth of the country. . . . For the unsuspected incompatibilities which show themselves here, no individual is responsible; they arise out of the circumstances themselves, and the lower the level of the natives and the thinner the population, the harder is the problem. In Zululand, for example, agriculture and cattle-rearing are possible, and the natives develop naturally into a peasantry attached to

the land and practising home industries, while, at the same time, the population is so thick that the labour requirements of European trade can also be met; there, then, the problems of the condition of the natives and the promotion of civilisation among them are far less difficult than in the colonies where the country is mostly virgin forest and the population is at a really primitive stage of culture. Yet even there too it may come about that the economic progress aimed at by colonisation is secured at the expense of civilisation and the native standard of life.†

To go a step further:—

The Government alone can never discharge the duties of humanitarianism; from the nature of the case that rests with society and individuals.

It is individuals who must atone for all the blunders and cruelties of the past, regarding what they do, not as benevolence, but as the fulfilment of a duty, the payment of a debt. The simple duties of man to man must be performed without regard for considerations of race, or creed or nation.

It was with these convictions that Dr. Schweitzer, when he determined that for him thinking was not enough, that he must become a doctor and sacrifice his double Professorship at Strasbourg University, his music, and all the richness of his happy, many-sided life, chose for the scene of his activities a remote French colony, because there the need for medical help seemed greater than in the German colonies to which, as an Alsatian, it seemed in 1913 more natural he should go. And since he returned to Lambaréné for the second time in 1924, his Hospital has not only represented a work of atonement for the suffering of alien races, but an internationalism of deed which in the world of the spirit may be not less fraught with significance than the solemn deliberations of Geneva. Among his little band of voluntary workers past and present are representatives of five European nations, while the Hospital is known and helped by people in innumerable lands, even poor Japanese children in Hawaii sending

* As is the practical ideal in the Gold Coast Protectorate.

† See *On the Edge of the Primeval Forest*, pp. 117-118.

their mite to aid their poorer brethren in the African forest.

Dr. Schweitzer's preoccupation with the social condition of primitive races and his practical internationalism are no mere accidents. They rest on his philosophic conviction that all our divisions are a folly, seeing that all life is ONE and the ethical principle he calls Reverence for Life the one thing that matters. He feels that the primitive negro—his brother, but his younger brother as he calls him—in his fundamental attitude to things of the spirit is not so far from civilised man as is generally supposed.

Even though he can neither read nor write, he has ideas on many more subjects than we imagine. . . . The distinctions between white and coloured, educated and uneducated, disappear when one gets talking with the forest-dweller about our relations to each other, to mankind, to the universe and to the infinite.

The broad religious tolerance which characterises Dr. Schweitzer was already with him when in his childhood it first seemed a beautiful thing that Protestants and Catholics should share the church of which his father and the village priest were joint pastors. Later when, both from the standpoint of the philosopher and theologian he studied deeply all the great faiths of the world, it was with no indiscriminating tolerance. He expressly disclaims for Christianity any pre-eminence in rivalry with other faiths that cannot be maintained by thinking and by the intrinsic truth for which it stands, but his con-

clusion is that it is both the deepest religion and the deepest philosophy.

Borne on the warm current of Divine Love is Albert Schweitzer himself, man of action and mystic, in the world yet not of the world. What he thinks he lives. His books—although three are also "popular,"* and all are straightforward and easy to read—appeal to the most erudite, his acts to the simplest. There is no man in this age of disconsolate wandering in search of a creed to live by whose life and works better repay study. There gleams through his acts, as through his pages, a golden thread of hope for the unity and brotherhood of all who share in the glorious phenomenon called Life.

LILIAN M. RUSSELL

[MRS. RUSSELL was an inspector in the Children's Department of the Home Office of Great Britain from 1917-23, and has worked for Dr. Schweitzer since 1927. She writes about the labour of love bestowed in a very Theosophical spirit by Dr. Schweitzer in an out of the way corner of the world and of which more people should know.

Dr. Schweitzer is an Alsatian and was born in 1895. He studied at the universities of Strasbourg, Berlin and Paris. After taking degrees in Theology, Philosophy and Medicine and resigning two professorial chairs at Strasbourg University and his positions as Assistant Rector of the Church of St. Nicholas and Warden of the Theological College, he went to Africa in 1913 as a medical missionary and founded a Hospital on the banks of Ogowe, in the Gaboon territory, close to the equator. He is an authority on Bach and on organ-building, and on visits to Europe earns money to continue his Hospital by giving organ recitals and lectures. Among his best known books are *On the Edge of the Primeval Forest*, *Civilization and Ethics*, *The Life of J. H. Bach* and *The Quest of Historical Jesus*.—EDS.]

* viz., "*On the Edge of the Primeval Forest*, which has been reprinted at least seven times in English, and has been translated also into French, Dutch, Swedish and Japanese; *More From the Primeval Forest*, which appeared in English 1931. (Both published by Black, London, at 6s. illustrated); and *Memoirs of Childhood and Youth* (Allen & Unwin, London, 3s.6d.)

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"———ends of verse

And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS.

In the *New York Times Magazine* for 27th March, S. J. Woolf publishes his interview with Sven Hedin, the famous explorer, whose opinion about the influence of Europe on Asia is worth recording:

I have seen the havoc that the white man has wrought. Into a sleepy, contented, happy land he with his egotism has come and said, 'Take on my ways'. And what are those ways? Ways of gain. That is the white man's chief thought. Exploitation for profit. The few improvements and betterments which he has brought with him do not repay the Asiatics for the unhappiness which has followed in his wake. . . .

Atheism is spreading rapidly among its people, and the wonderful old temples are fast decaying and becoming ruins. . .

It is a most common occurrence to see the Lama temples, surrounded on all sides by Chinese farms, used as tool-houses. But though Buddha has gone, Confucius has not taken his place.

When I first went into Asia, the people were contented. Now throughout the land is a new feeling; it is a feeling of unrest and of not knowing exactly what will happen next. It is hard to graft Western thought on an Eastern trunk. The result is not likely to produce a flower.

Think of all that Asia gave before it was touched by the civilization of Europe. Think of the art of the Chinese, who but a short 200 years ago were putting up buildings which for their harmonious beauty rank with the finest architecture in the world. That was an architecture unspoiled by Western ideas. It was

a natural product of the soil and climate and adapted to the uses to which it was put. Persia and India, too, have given their share to the world. They gave before the European, with his Occidental notions, came and tried to change the people and make them like himself.

The above recalls certain words of a great Teacher written in 1880:

"As we find the world now whether Christian, Mussulman, or Pagan, justice is disregarded, and honour and mercy are both flung to the winds. In a word, how—since the main objects of the Theosophical Society are misinterpreted by those who are most willing to serve us personally—are we to deal with the rest of mankind? With that curse known as 'the struggle for life,' which is the real and most prolific parent of most woes and sorrows, and all crimes? Why has that struggle become almost the universal Scheme of the universe? We answer: because no religion, with the exception of Buddhism has taught practical contempt for this earthly life; while each of them, always with that one solitary exception has through its hells and damnations inculcated the greatest dread of death. There-

fore do we find that struggle for life raging most fiercely in Christian countries, most prevalent in Europe and America. It weakens in the Pagan lands, and is nearly unknown among Buddhist populations. In China during famine, and where the masses are most ignorant of their own or of any religion, it was remarked that those mothers who devoured their children belonged to localities where there were the most Christian missionaries to be found; where there were none and the Bonzes alone had the field the population died with the utmost indifference. Teach the people to see that life on this earth even the happiest, is but a burden and an illusion; that it is our own Karma, the cause producing the effect, that is our own judge—our saviour in future lives—and the great struggle for life will soon lose its intensity. There are no penitentiaries in Buddhist lands, and crime is nearly unknown among the Buddhist Tibetans. The world in general, and Christendom especially, left for 2,000 years to the *regime* of a personal God, as well as to its political and social systems based on that idea, has now proved a failure."

In the *Saturday Review of Literature* (New York) Henry Pratt Fairchild, Professor of Sociology at New York University, comments upon the danger of be-

lieving blindly in modern science, and its incapacity to assist man in leading the good life. Thus:—

We live in a scientific age, and science has become a fetish, that is, an object worshipped for qualities which it is believed to possess, but really lacks. We have come to look to science for solution of all problems. But the truth is that science does not, and cannot, offer the solution for any problems of final interest. Science merely furnishes the instrumentalities for the solution of problems. Every problem involves a final objective, and all final objectives are axiomatic. Science can never prove what is good, or beautiful. It can prove what is true and useful only in respect to certain postulated values. The sooner we stop looking to science as the one reliable guide to the good life, the sooner will we be able to set our feet hopefully on the path that leads there.

Over forty years ago in her *Secret Doctrine* (II, 663-64) H. P. Blavatsky warned the then scientific researcher:

For the province of exact, real Science, materialistic though it be, is to carefully avoid anything like guess-work, speculation which *cannot be verified*; in short, all *suppressio veri* and all *suggestio falsi*. The business of the man of exact Science is to observe, each in his chosen department, the phenomena of nature; to record, tabulate, compare and classify the facts, down to the smallest minutiae which are *presented to the observation of the senses with the help of all the exquisite mechanism that modern invention supplies, not by the aid of metaphysical flights of fancy*. All that he has a legitimate right to do, is to correct by the assistance of physical instruments the defects or illusions of his own coarser vision, auditory powers, and other senses. He has no right to trespass on the grounds of metaphysics and psychology. His duty is to verify and

to rectify all the facts that *fall under his direct* observation; to profit by the experiences and mistakes of the Past in endeavouring to trace the working of a certain concatenation of cause and effects, which, but only by its constant and unvarying repetition, may be called A LAW. This it is which a man of science is expected to do, if he would become a teacher of men and remain true to his original programme of natural or physical sciences. Any sideway path from this royal road becomes *speculation*.

Instead of keeping to this, what does many a so-called man of science do in these days? He rushes into the domains of pure metaphysics, while deriding it. He delights in rash conclusions and calls it "a *deductive* law from the *inductive* law" of a theory based upon and drawn out of the depths of his own consciousness: that consciousness being perverted by, and honeycombed with, one-sided materialism. He attempts to explain the "origin" of things, which are yet embosomed only in his own conceptions. He attacks spiritual beliefs and religious traditions millenniums old, and denounces everything, save his own hobbies, as superstition. He suggests theories of the Universe, a Cosmogony developed by blind, mechanical forces of nature alone, far more *miraculous and impossible* than even one based upon the assumption of *fiat lux* out of *nihil*—and tries to astonish the world by such a wild theory; which, being known to emanate from a scientific brain, is taken on *blind faith* as very scientific and the outcome of SCIENCE.

During the last month Bombay has witnessed the degrading spectacle of communal riots when men showed what power the beast in human nature possesses. Below we quote a pertinent paragraph from the stenographic report of a

lecture delivered in July 1930, at the Bombay United Lodge of Theosophists:—

"What shall India do? India must turn from religions to Religion; India must destroy superstition and ignorance and find spiritual Knowledge; must leave aside blind belief and beget illumined faith. Let us invoke and evoke, call to action the Will, the Spiritual and Golden Will that alone will enable us to do away with our own superstitions and strike the blow at our ignorance. If every Hindu brother were to live and practise the Truth of the Vedas that every man and woman is an aspect of the great Purusha; if every Moslem were to recognize the fact of his own religion that every man and woman lives by the Nur of Allah; if every Parsi were to recognize that it is far more spiritual and noble and better to be an *Indian* than to be only a Parsi, and that as a true Zoroastrian he must first fight Ahriman within himself and within his own community; if every Sikh were to follow the wise precepts of Guru Nanak and his predecessor, Kabir; if every Indian Christian were to realize that the light of Christos is that light which lighteth every child that cometh into the world; Ah! then, and then only, would we really raise ourselves and help to elevate the world."